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A B S T R A C T    .  
 
Reliability evaluation of generation, transmission and distribution systems is an 
important requirement in overall power system planning and operation. Due to the enormity 
of the problem, reliability analysis is not usually conducted on a complete power system and 
reliability evaluations of generating facilities, transmission systems, and of distribution 
system segments are usually conducted independently. The reliability indices obtained for 
each segment are then used to make decisions. This kind of analysis generally assumes that 
the other parts of the system are fully reliable and capable of performing their intended 
functions. A more realistic procedure involves categorizing the generating, transmission and 
distribution zones into hierarchical levels and performing reliability analysis of these levels. 
This research illustrates the reliability indices which can be obtained at these hierarchical 
levels (HLs). The analysis considers element outages in all parts of an electric power system 
to provide a comprehensive assessment of the overall system. The concepts involved in the 
reliability evaluation of a complete power network are presented using an educational test 
system developed at the University of Saskatchewan-Canada known as the Roy Billinton Test 
System R.B.T.S. 
An electric power system is a three segments system, of generation, transmission and 
distribution. These segments are referred to functional zones. The functional zones can be 
combined to form hierarchical levels (HL). 
This thesis illustrates how system planers and operators can incorporate the reliability 
assessment in a range of power system application. All the approaches used in the research 
are described in details, permitting the comprehension of the techniques to assess power 
systems for reliability studies. The evaluation allows engineers to take judgments for different 
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HLI= Hierarchical level one 
HLII= Hierarchical level two 
HLIII= Hierarchical level three 
LOLE= Loss of load expectation 
LOEE= loss of energy expectation  
RBTS= Roy Billinton Test System 
A= Availability 
U= Unavailability 
ELC= Expected load curtailment 
EENS= Expected energy not supplied 
EDLC= Expected duration of load curtailment 
OOP= Object-oriented programming  
OOA= Object Oriented Analysis  
OMT= Object Modeling Technique 
TOO= Theory Oriented Object 
DG= Distributed Generator. 
DR= Distributed Resource. 
EPS= Electric Power System. 
RA= Reliability Analysis. 
Relative_CAIDI= Relative Customer Average Interruption Duration Index. 
CEA= Canadian Electric Association. 
SAIDI= System Average Interruption Duration Index. 
CAIDI= Customer Average Interruption Duration Index. 
EPRI= Electric Power Research Institute. 
S= Segment of interest. 
L= Set of all segments whose failure cause loss of power to S. 
SSL= Set of segments that may be isolated between S and the original 
source. 
NSSL= Set of segments that cannot be isolated between S and the 
original source. 
SL= Set of segments that can be switched away from S, and S may be 
fed by an alternate source. 
  
NSL= Set consists of the segments that cannot be switched away from 
S. That is the segment of interest it self. 
SAF= Set, if the failed component lies in these segments, it is possible to 
restore power to S by an alternate source. 
NSAF= Set, if the failed segment belongs to this set, S cannot be 
temporarily restored from an alternate feed. 
SF= Set of all segments that can be isolated from S and an alternative 
source, allowing power to be restored to S from the alternative 
source (without system constraint violations during the 
restoration). 
NSF= Set of all segments may be isolated from S and an alternative 
source, and it is not possible to restore power to S because of 
violating system constraints. 
SIC= Set of all the segments in the circuit. 
SW= Set of all the sectionalizing devices in the circuit. 
AF= Set of available alternate sources (feeds). 
IS= Set of sectionalizing devices that will isolate S from the original 
sources. 
IS= Set of sectionalizing devices that will isolate the segment of 
interest S from the original sources. 
NIS= Set of switches that do not isolate the original source from the 
segment of interest. 
EC= Set of ending components for the circuit. 
PD= Set of protective devices in the circuit that isolates a load point of 
interest from its source. 
FTm= Forward component Trace beginning with component m. 
BTm= Backward component trace beginning with m. 
FPTm= Feeder Path component Trace of the component m. 
ECT= Ending Component Trace. 
FSTm= Forward Segment Trace from segment m. 
FPSTm= Feeder Path Segment Trace for the element m. 
AFT= Alternative Feed Trace. 
pFSeg= Pointer to Forward Segment. 
pBSeg= Pointer to Backward Segment. 
  
PSeg= Pointer to Segment device for component. 
CAFK= Minimum remaining component power capacity in the FPTAF for 
the kth alternative feed, k=1,2,3…n. 
CAFm= Represents the greatest minimum remaining capacity available 
among the alternative sources. 
Frj= The failure rate for component j. 
FRi= Failure rate for segment i. 
Repj= Average repair time for component j. 
REPi= Average repair time for segment i. 
DTi= Down time for segment i. 
SOTi= Switch operation time to re-supply segment S due to the failure of 
segment i 
DTC= Total customer down time. 
RTs= Average restoration time for segment S. 
Seg_LP_FR= Segment load point failure rate. 





































The basic function of an electric power system is to meet customer electricity 
requirements, with adequate quality and reliability, and in an economical manner. Electric 
utilities have for the most part, attained this objective. This has been accomplished by 
employing reliability criteria in generating, transmission, and distribution planning based on 
the application of probabilistic techniques and rules-of-thumb that have evolved over many 
years of operating experience. There is, however, an emerging recognition in the industry that 
the traditional practice of providing all users with a uniform and a very high level of service 
reliability merits a re-examination. There is a growing feeling that investments related to the 
provision of electric service reliability should be more explicitly evaluated as to their cost 
benefit implications. Such an overall power system reliability evaluation answering the 
fundamental reliability question in power system planning: How much reliability is adequate. 
Specifically, utilities are recognizing the need for information on customer interruption and 
costs. This activity is often referred to as a value of service reliability assessment. [1] 
A wide range of probabilistic techniques have been developed in this field [2-7]. The 
basic trust is the recognition of the stochastic behavior of power systems and that all input and 
output event parameters are probabilistic variables. These techniques attempt to recognize the 
severity of an outage event, its impact on system behavior and operation, together with the 
likelihood (probability) of its occurrence. While estimates of unreliability can be derived, 
such as expected un-served energy due to supply short falls, there is a strong requirement for 
developing techniques which put also these estimates in economic terms. 
2. Power System Reliability 
The basic aim of every electric power utility is to meet its energy and load demand 
requirement at the lowest possible cost to the customers while maintaining acceptable levels 
of quality and continuity of supply. The ability of an electric power network to provide an 
adequate supply of electrical energy is usually designated by the term of (power system 
reliability) [2, 8-10,12]. The generic term ‘reliability’, however, has a very wide range of 
meaning and cannot be associated with a single specific definition. Reliability, in general 
terms, can be defined as the probability of a device performing its intended function 
adequately over the period of time intended under the operating conditions encountered [1]. It 
  
is therefore necessary to recognize the extreme generality of this term and to use it to indicate 
in a general rather than a specific sense the overall ability of a system to perform its intended 
function. The concept of power-system reliability is extremely broad and covers all aspects of 
the ability of the system to satisfy the customer requirements. Power system reliability 
assessment, both deterministic and probabilistic, can be divided into the two basic aspects of 
system adequacy and system security [1,], which is shown in Figure 1. 
 
System adequacy relates to the existence of sufficient facilities within the system to 
satisfy the consumer load demand. The system adequacy includes the facilities necessary to 
generate sufficient energy and the associated transmission and distribution facilities required 
to transport the energy to the actual consumer load points. Adequacy therefore relates to static 
system conditions. System security, on the other hand, is associated with the ability of the 
system to respond to disturbances arising within that system and therefore linked with system 
dynamics [12,18]. Most of the indices used at the present time are adequacy indices and not 
overall reliability indices. Most of the probabilistic techniques presently available for power-
system reliability evaluation are in the domain of adequacy assessment. The techniques 
presented in this work deals strictly with adequacy assessment of electric power systems. 
3. Functional zones and hierarchical levels 
An electric power system can be broadly divided into the three segments of 
generation, transmission and distribution. These segments are commonly referred to as 
functional zones [9]. While this division of the power system may seem somewhat simplistic, 
it is very appropriate as most electric power utilities are either divided into such zones for the 
System Reliabil ity  
System Security  System Adequacy  
Figure 1 Sub-division of System Reliability 
  
purposes of organization, planning and/or analysis or are solely responsible for one of these 
functions. Adequacy studies can be, and frequently are, conducted individually in each of 
these three zones [3]. The functional zones of an electric power system can be combined to 
form hierarchical levels. This categorization is depicted in figure 2.  Adequacy assessment 
techniques can also be grouped under these hierarchical levels (HL). Adequacy evaluation at 
HLI is concerned with only the adequacy of the generation to meet the system load 
requirement and this area of activity is usually termed as generating capacity reliability 
evaluation. Both generation and the associated transmission facilities are considered at HLII 
adequacy assessment and are sometimes referred to as composite system or bulk system 
adequacy evaluation. HLIII adequacy assessment involves the consideration of all the three 
functional zones in an attempt to evaluate customer load point adequacies. 
  
Evaluation at HLIII is therefore termed as overall power system adequacy assessment. 
HLI indices are utilized by most utilities. The most popular technique used in HLI assessment 










Figure 2 Hierarchical Levels in Electric Power systems 
  
values of loss of energy expectation (LOEE) as their HLI adequacy criteria. At the HLII 
level, various predictive and performance indices have been recommended and are utilized. 
Small utilities also produce an annual summary of utility service continuity performance at 
HLIII. 
4. Objectives of the research 
Reliability evaluation of a complete electric power system including generation, 
transmission and distribution facilities is an important requirement in overall power system 
planning and operation. Due to the enormity of the problem, reliability analysis is not usually 
conducted on a complete power system and reliability evaluations of generating facilities, 
transmission systems, and of distribution system segments are usually conducted 
independently. The reliability indices obtained for each segment are then used to make 
decisions. This kind of analysis generally assumes that the other parts of the system fully 
reliable and capable of performing their intended functions. This form of analysis may 
therefore provide a highly optimistic appraisal of the system behavior. HLIII evaluation, 
which includes random failures in all the functional zones is quite complex in most systems as 
it involves starting at the generation points and terminating at the individual customer load 
points. The prime objective of the research on one hand is to put a foot in the world of power 
system reliability assessment by performing a reliability assessment at HLIII, i.e., to consider 
the independent failures in the three functional zones of generation, transmission and 
distribution, in order to obtain practical estimates of the reliability indices for each system 
customer load point. On the other hand, the objective was to build a base in the world of 
technical software, and specially reliability evaluation software. The effect on the customer 
reliability indices of some basic factors associated with each functional zone within the 
system was investigated. A reliability test system is used to illustrate the concepts. This is the 
R o y  B i l l i n t o n  T e s t  S y s t e m  ( R B T S )  [ 3 2 - 3 4 ] . 
5. Outline of thesis 
There is an increasing interest in power system reliability evaluation for planning, 
design, operation and expansion. Reliability analysis is concerned with the evaluation of 
reliability with different system configurations/operating practices and the corresponding 
customers end indices. The actual or perceived customer end indices can used to determine 
  
the worth of electric service reliability. This thesis presents an approach to perform reliability 
analysis in an overall power system considering the influence of outages in all parts of the 
electric power system. Application of reliability analysis in generating, transmission and 
distribution planning is illustrated using a test system. 
This research has been divided into four chapters. The basic concepts of reliability 
assessment in composite generation and transmission systems are given in chapter 1. This 
chapter briefly describes the frequency and duration method used to analyze the system for 
reliability study for the HLII hierarchical level, and various reliability indices utilized in 
composite generation and transmission systems were depicted. 
The distribution system is that part of an electric system which provides a link 
between the bulk load centers and the actual customer locations in the system. It can be 
categorized into a sub transmission system and the radial or meshed distribution system. Most 
distribution systems operate as radial systems even if they are capable of being connected in a 
mesh though normally open points. In chapter 1 also the most common components of the 
approach used in distribution system reliability evaluation are discussed and theories behind 
them are briefly introduced, such as “performance indices, reliability analysis components, 
reliability analysis sets”. Moreover this chapter shows how reconfigurations of the system 
and by appropriate switching operations improve the reliability of the power system. 
One of the objectives of this research is to evaluate power system reliability analysis 
improvements with DGs (distributed generations) while satisfying equipment power handling 
constraints. In this research, a computer algorithm involving pointers and linked list [3] is 
developed to analyze the distribution power system reliability. This algorithm needs to 
converge rapidly as it is to be used for systems containing thousands of components. So an 
efficient computer software design and implementation is investigated. 
Chapter 1 presents the models used in the thesis. It provides an overview of applying 
circuit traces in determining the reliability analysis (RA) sets by using pointers and linked 
lists. This chapter presents the computer algorithm used to develop the reliability analysis 
(RA) sets. This analysis relies on two general classes of information to estimate the 
distribution system reliability; component reliability parameters and system structure. After 
finding the reliability analysis sets for the segment of interest S “load point of interest”, 
distribution system reliability indices are found. A measure of reliability referred to as 
  
‘Relative_CAIDI’ is introduced. The ‘Relative_CAIDI’ helps to identify the areas in the system 
t h o s e  n e e d  r e l i a b i l i t y  i m p r o v e m e n t . 
In chapter 2 the test system used to illustrate the concepts of reliability evaluation is 
described in details form the production to the distribution parts. All the approach described 
in chapter 1 are applied on the well-known Roy Billinton Test System (R.B.T.S), to give a real 
overview and more ideas on the robustness of the approach presented in this thesis. The 
chapter encloses one hand the results of the HLII analysis, on the other hand the distribution 
system assessment simulation results without considering the effect of the HLII on the 
distribution parts i.e., considering that the HLII level is 100 % reliable. The chapter ends with 
comparison of reliability improvements for all the segments and load points for the Roy 
B i l l i n t o n  T e s t  S y s t e m . 
 Chapter 3 is devoted to the development of a data generator for calculating (mainly) 
the reliability, load flow, the static and dynamic stability of electrical grid network; and other 
constraints that may affect it, namely, short-circuit and lightning. Draw up of this generator is 
based on the theory of programming called "oriented objects" which is a software program 
using a definite bottom-up design like "messages" exchanged by called basic entities objects; 
this theory, which makes the behavior of an object, describes how this one changes state with 
the reception of messages of other objects and how it transmits itself the messages to the other 
objects. The work presented in chapter 3 is an attempt to put and to have a foot in the world of 
software industry; it is a path toward a realization (construction) of practical application in the 
electrical field. 
In order to perform an overall power system reliability analysis (HLIII reliability 
evaluation), it was necessary to develop techniques for this purpose. It was necessary to have 
a complete test system with generation, transmission, and radial distribution system facilities, 
in order to illustrate the developed techniques. Chapter 4 presents the concepts of overall 
power system reliability evaluation. This chapter also presents the relative contributions of the 
overall HLIII indices from the HLII and the distribution functional zone. Techniques theories 
for this intention are presented; also the chapter introduces the HLIII indices calculation. At 
the end the results are revealed in a series of tables screening different indices for load points 
of the Roy Billinton Test System, and also indices for the whole system are depicted. 
The thesis ends with a conclusion and some future research issues are identified. 
  
Chap t e r  1  
RE L I A B I L I T Y  
EV A L U A T I O N  
IN :  
CO M P O S I T E  G E N E R A T I O N  
A N D  T R A N S M I S S I O N  
SY S T E M S ,  A N D  I N  






Power system reliability assessment can be performed for two distinct periods: the 
past and the future [2,3]. Assessment of future system performance is valuable and can be 
used to predict how that system is expected to behave in the future, the benefits of alternate 
system designs, reinforcements, expansion plants and the related cost/worth/benefit of the 
alternatives. This chapter presents predictive indices at hierarchical level two HLII. 
Generating capacity adequacy evaluation is primarily concerned with estimating the 
necessary generating capacity to satisfy the system load requirements. A basic objective in 
generating system planning is to determine the necessary generating capacity to satisfy the 
system demand in the presence of scheduled and unscheduled outages and unforeseen 
variations in the system load. A second equally important objective is the development of a 
suitable transmission network to carry the generated energy to the bulk load centers. This 
aspect must be dealt with in conjunction with the available generating facilities such that there 
is adequate transmission for the planned generation. Lastly, adequate distribution facilities 
must be designed in order to transport the available energy from the bulk load centers to the 
actual customer terminals. The basic concepts and indices for the evaluation for composite 
generation and transmission systems are presented in this chapter. The Roy Billinton test 
system is used to illustrate the concepts is presented [32-34]. 
1 .2 .  Composi te  System Adequacy  Assessment :  [ 1 ,40] 
Bulk adequacy evaluation techniques are concerned with the composite problem of 
assessing the generation and transmission facilities in regard to their ability to supply 
adequate, dependable and suitable electrical energy at the bulk load points [35]. A basic 
objective of bulk power system adequacy assessment is to provide quantitative outputs and 
evaluation added to the qualitative engineering judgments of the customer load demand at 
acceptable levels of quality and availability. Such assessment also is crucial and gives inputs 
to other studies and analysis like economic development for a cost/benefit analysis. There is, 
however, no consensus in the electric power industry as to which adequacy indices are the 
most appropriate. This can be constructed to simply reflect the actual complicity of the 
problem of HLII adequacy assessment or to indicate the variety of purposes for which these 
indices may be used. In order to make objective system design or planning decisions, it is 
therefore more appropriate to study a variety of adequacy indices which convey meaningful 
  
information regarding the performance of the system under investigation. Adequacy 
evaluation and planning at HLII is normally comprised of the following basic steps [36]. 
1. Evaluate the performance of the power network without removing any component. 
This can be designated as studying the performance of the base case system. 
2. Make changes in the system configuration due to the outage(s) of various 
components. 
3. Check the adequacy of the modified power system. 
4. Take if necessary, corrective actions such as rescheduling of the generating units, 
line overloads alleviation, correction of bus voltages and load curtailment at buses. 
5. Calculate the adequacy indices for the individual load buses and for the whole 
system. 
Extensive work in the area of HLII adequacy evaluation has been done all around the 
world for the importance of this part of the power system in regards to the distribution system 
reliability assessment. 
1.2.1. Reliability indices 
 The reliability indices determined in an HLII study can be grounded into two 
categories, namely load point indices and system indices [37]. The calculation of both this sets 
of indices is necessary to obtain a complete picture of the bulk power system adequacy i.e., 
these indices complement rather than substitute for each other. Individual loads points indices 
are necessary to identify the weak points in the system and to help establish optimum 
response to design changes, of the system under steady states condition. The individual load 
point indices can also be further divided into the relative contributions to bulk system 
unreliability associated with the generation and transmission functional zones. Overall system 
indices provide an appreciation of global HLII adequacy and can be used by planner and 
managers for comparing the adequacies of different systems. The severity of an outage event 
depends on the components under outage, their relative importance and their location in the 
network. An outage event may affect only a small area (bus) of the system or a large area 
(several buses). It is important to identify the areas of the system which have poor reliability 
and/or, are prone to disturbances. Such information cannot be obtained from the system 
ind ices ,  bu t  i s  r e ad i l y ava i l ab l e  f rom the  ind iv idua l  l o ad  po in t  va lues .  
  
 A wide range of HLII adequacy indices are provided from several references [37,38]. 
Some of the indices utilized in this these are described in this section. HLII adequacy indices 
are usually expressed and calculated on an annual basis. These indices obtained using the 
actual load variation over a year, are known as annual indices. However, indices can be 
calculated for any period such as a season, a month and also for a particular operating 
condition. Indices can also be calculated for a particular load level and expressed on an annual 
basis. 
1.2.1.1. Load point indices 
 There are tree fundamental parameters in the evaluation of load point adequacy. These 
are the frequency, duration and severity associated failure events. The probability can be 
derived by multiplying the frequency and duration values. Computationally, however, it is 
often easier to compute the event probabilities and frequencies and use them to derive the 
durations. These basic indices can be defined for generation systems, composite systems 
distribution systems and at the HLIII system level. Additional indices can also be created 
from these basic values [1,37,38, 40]. 
a. Basic values 




                           
 
                               
     
Where: j is an outage condition in the network, 
Pj : is the state probability of the outage event j, 
Fj : is the frequency of occurrence of the outage event j, 
Pkj: is the probability of load at bus k exceeding the maximum load that can be 
supplied at that bus during the outage event j. 
                                                                             
     
 
                                                                    
     
                       
  
                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                     
     
 
 
                                                              
     
 
 
                                                                                                                      
     
 
Where: j є x includes all contingencies resulting in load curtailment at bus k, 
 j є y includes all contingencies resulting in isolation of bus k, 
Lkj: is the load curtailment at bus k to alleviate line overloads arising due to outage 
event j, or load not supplied at an isolated bus k due to the outage event, 
Dkj: is the duration in hours of the load curtailment arising due to the outage event j, 
or the duration in hours of the load curtailment at an isolated bus k due to the outage 
event j. 
1.2.1.2. System indices: 
a. Basic values: 
                                                               
      
 
                                              
  
              
  
  
    
       
                                                                                   
  
                    
  
                                                  
 
                                                    
  
                 
      
                                                                              
  
It should be also be appreciated that although the HLII indices add realism to the 
analysis by including bulk transmission, they steel are adequacy indicators and do not include 
the ability of the system to respond to transient disturbances. 
1.2.2. Outage model 
A component is on outage when it is unavailable to perform its intended function. A 
component outage, however, may or may not cause load interruption. Outage events may 
occur such that they are independent of other outages or where they are consequences of other 
failures within the system. These are classified as independent and dependent outages 
respectively. Simultaneous outages of two or more components are referred to as overlapping 
outages. The basic component model used in these applications is the two-state system 
represented in figure 1.1 in which the component is assumed to be either up or down. The rate 
of departure from the component up state to its down state is the component failure rate λ. The 
restoration of the component to its operating state is denoted by another transition rate termed 
the component repair rate µ. The actual restoration process could be high or low speed 
automatic re-closure, repair or simple replacement of the failed component by a spare. 
Different restoration rates are associated with each of these activities. The component 
availability/unavailability [40] is governed by both λ and µ. 
 
Overlapping independent outages of two components can be modeled as shown in 
figure 1.2 the probabilities, frequencies and durations of the four states in which components 
can be obtained by a set of reliability simple equation [1]. This model can be extended to three 
or more components [40]. There are several failure modes which can be create dependence 
between the behavior if individual components [3]. It is therefore important to select the most 





Figure 1.1 Two states model for single component on outage 
  
 
1.2.3. Three unit states space diagram 
1.2.3.1 Fundamental development 
The concepts can perhaps be most easily seen by using a simple numerical example. 
The system described in Table 1.1 contains the basic data required for the analysis. This 
section illustrates the development of a system model using the fundamental relationship as it 
will be shown. This is not a practical approach for large system analysis using a digital 
computer. If each unit can exist in two states, then there are 2
n
 states in the total system where 
n = number of elements i.e. 23= 8 in this case. The total number of states in the system of table 
1.1 are enumerated in table 1.2. These states can also be represented as a state transition 
diagram as shown in Figure 1.3. This diagram enumerates all the possible system states and 
also shows the transition modes from one state to another. As an example, given that the 
system is in State 2 in which element 1 is down and the others are up, the system can transit to 
States 1, 5 or 6 in the following ways: 
From State 2 to 1 if element 1 is repaired. 
From State 2 to 5 if element 2 fails. 









1  Down 
2  UP   2 
Figure 1.2 Model for overlapping independent outages of two 
components 
1  UP 
2  Down   3 
1  UP 
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1 25 0.01 0.49 0.98 0.02 
2 25 0.01 0.49 0.98 0.02 
3 50 0.01 0.49 0.98 0.02 
For example, if the elements are generator units, so the last line is the information of 
the capacity out of service in the system. If the elements are transmission lines in parallel so 
the information will be the maximum megawatts which can be delivered to the load points. 
The total rate of departure from State 2 is therefore the sum of the individual rates of 
departure (µ1+λ2+λ3). The probabilities associated with each state in Table 1.2 can be easily 
calculated assuming event independence. The frequencies of encountering each state are 

















































obtained when the rate of departure or entry is the sum of the appropriate rates. The basic 
m a n i p u l a t i o n s  a r e  s h o w n  i n  T a b l e  1 . 3 . 
Table 1.2 Failure modes and effects 
State number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Element No. 1 U D U U D D U D 
Element No. 2 U U D U D U D D 
Element No. 3 U U U D U D D D 
Capacity out: 0 25 25 50 50 75 75 100 
 











1 0 (0.98x0.98x0.98) = 0.941192 0.03 (0.941192)x(0.03) = 0.02823576 
2 25 (0.02x0.98x0.98) = 0.019208 0.51 (0.019208)x(0.51) = 0.00979608 
3 25 (0.98)(0.02x0.98) = 0.019208 0.51 (0.019208)x(0.51) = 0.00979608 
4 50 (0.98)(0.98x0.02) = 0.019208 0.51 (0.019208)x(0.51) = 0.00979608 
5 50 (0.02x0.02x0.98) = 0.000392 0.99 (0.000392)x(0.99) = 0.00038808 
6 75 (0.02)(0.98x0.02) = 0.000392 (0.99 (0.000392)x(0.99) = 0.00038808 
7 75 (0.98X0.02X0.02) = 0.000392 (0.99 (0.000392x0.99) = 0.00038808 
8 100 (0.02)(0.02X0.02) = 0.000008 1.47 (0.000008)x( 1.47) = 0.00001176 
          Total        = 1.000000   
 
1.3. Numerical example for different configurations 
1.3.1 Network configurations [40] 
The total problem of assessing the adequacy of the generation and bulk power 
transmission systems in regard to providing a dependable and suitable supply at the terminal 
stations can be designated as composite system reliability evaluation. The analysis of the 
system for a reliability study depends on the system configuration, either simple radial 
generation transmission system and meshed configurations. 
  
1.3.1.1. Radial configurations 
One of the first major applications of composite system evaluation was the 
consideration of transmission elements in interconnected system generating capacity 
evaluation. The analysis at the load point L of the system shown in Figure 1.4 can be done 
using the loss of load expectation (LOLE), loss of energy expectation (LOEE) or frequency 
and duration (F&D) techniques [40], the (F&D) was introduced in section 1.2.3 and is used in 
this thesis. The linking configuration between the generation source and the load point may 
not be of the simple series-parallel type shown in Figure 1.4 but could be a relatively 
complicated d.c transmission configuration where the transmission capability is dependent 
upon the availability of the rectifier and inverter bridges, the filters at each end and the 
associated pole equipment. The development of the transmission model may be relatively 
complex but once obtained can be combined with the generation model to produce a 
composite model at the load point. 
 
The progressive development of an equivalent model is relatively straightforward for a 
radial configuration such as that shown in Figure 1.4. This approach, however, is not suitable 
for networked configurations including dispersed generation and load points. A more general 
approach is required which can include the ability of the system to maintain adequate voltage 
levels, line loadings and steady state stability limits. 
A more general set of equations can be obtained directly from the probability 
condition theory. Respectively the probability and the frequency of failure are: 
                                                                      
 
 








Bj = an outage condition in the transmission network. 
Plj = Probability of load at bus K exceeding the maximum load that can be supplied at 
that bus without. 
In this case, the generation outages are treated individually, as are the transmission 
outage events, and the generation schedule and resulting load flow are modified accordingly. 
It should be noted, however, that Equation (1.12) does not include a frequency component due 
to load model transitions. This could be included but it would require the assumption that all 
system loads transit from high to low load levels at the same time. Equation (1.12) also 
includes possible frequency components due to transitions between states each of which 
represent a failure condition. 
Equations (1.11) and (1.12) are applied to the system shown in Figure 1.4 using the 
following data. 
Generating units: 6 x40 MW units λ= 0.01 f/day = 3.65 f/yr. 
µ = 0,49 r/day = 178.85 r/yr 
U=0.02 
Transmission elements: 2 lines λ = 0.5 f/yr 
r= 7.5 hours/repair 
U = 0.0004279 
Load:  Peak load = 180MW 
Where the basic element parameter used in the evaluation is the probability of finding 
that element on forced outage at some distant time in the future. This probability was defined 
in Engineering Systems as the unit unavailability, and historically in power system 
applications it is known as the unit forced outage rate (FOR). It is the ratio of two time values 
[47]. 
                       
 
   
 
 







                            
  
                                                                   
            
                       
             
               
 
   
 
 







        
                                                                   
          
                       
                   
Where  
  = expected failure rate 
  = expected repair rate 
m = mean time to failure = MTTF = 1/   
r = mean time to repair = MTTR = 1/   
m + r = mean time between failures = MTBF = 1/f 
f= cycle frequency = 1/T 
T= cycle time = l/f 
The load is represented by a straight-line load — duration curve from the 100% to the 
70% load points. For the system shown on figure 1.4 the generating capacity model (capacity 
outage probability table) is shown in Table 1.4, and the transmission capability model in 
Table 1.5. The capability of each line is designated as X in Table 1.5. The actual carrying 
capability will depend on the criterion of success at the load point. If a line rating can be 
nominally assigned the problem becomes one of transport rather than service quality and it 
becomes somewhat simpler. 














1 0 240 0.88584238 21.9 19.399948 
2 1 200 0.10847049 197.1 21.379534 
3 2 160 0.00553421 372.3 2.060386 
4 3 120 0,00015059 547.5 0.082448 
5 4 80 0.0000023 722.7 0.001666 
6 5 40 0.00000002 897.9 0.000017 
7 6 0 0.00000000 1073.1 0.000000 
  
 
Table 1.5 Transmission system model 
State 











1 0 2X 0.999144 1 0.999144 
2 1 1X 0.000855 1168.5 0.999574 
3 2 0X 1.8E-07 2336 0.000428 
X = rating of each line in MW 
   
Table 1.6 shows the composite state probabilities and frequencies assuming that the 
individual line-carrying capability X is 160 MW. Equation (1.12) includes possible transitions 
between failure states and will therefore give an expected failure frequency at the load point 
which is slightly higher than that determined by creating the complete 21-state Markov model 
and evaluating the frequency of transitions across a specified capacity boundary wall.  
In this case transitions between failure states would not be included. The probability 
and frequency component for each state is weighted by the probability that the load will 
exceed the capability of that state to give the failure probability and frequency. 
1.3.1.2. Meshed configuration [40] 
The technique illustrated with the radial configuration can be applied to networked or 
meshed configuration this application is illustrated using the system shown in Figure 1.5. 
Assume that the daily peak load curve for the period under study is a straight line from the 
100% to the 60% point and that the load-duration curve is a straight line from the 100% to the 
40% point. The peak load for the period is 110 MW.  
There is a range of possible solution techniques which can be used in this case. It 
should be fully appreciated that each approach involves different modeling techniques and 
therefore gives different load point reliability indices. The simplest approach is to assume that 
there are no transmission curtailment constraints and that continuity is the sole criterion. The 
next level is to use a transportation approach in which the line capability is pre-specified at 

















1 0G 0L 240 0.88508444 20.268433 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.0000000 
2 0G 1L 160 0.00075778 0.902061 0.37037038 0.00028066 0.3340970 
3 0G 2L 0 0.00000016 0.000382 1.0000000 0.00000016 0.0003820 
4 1G 0L 200 0.10837768 21.469619 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.0000000 
5 1G 1L 1 60.00 0.00009279 0.126713 0.37037038 0.00003437 0.0469310 
6 1G 2L 0 0.00000002 0.000050 1.00000000 0.00000002 0.0000500 
7 2G 0L 160 0.00552947 2.064152 0.37037038 0.00204795 0.7645010 
8 2G 1L 1 60.00 0.00000473 0.007294 0.37037038 0.00000175 0.0027020 
9 2G 2L 0 0.0000000 0.000003 1.0000000 0.00000000 0.0000030 
10 3G 0L 1 20.00 0.00015046 0.082528 1.0000000 0.00015046 0.0825280 
11 3G 1L 1 20.00 0.00000013 0.000221 1.0000000 0.00000013 0.0002210 
12 3G 2L 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.00000000 0.0000000 
13 4G 0L 80 0.0000023 0.001667 1.0000000 0.0000023 0.0016670 
14 4G 1L 80 0.0000000 0.000004 1.0000000 0.00000000 0.0000040 
15 4G 2L 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.00000000 0.0000000 
16 5G 0L 40 0.00000002 0.000017 1.0000000 0.00000002 0.0000170 
17 5G 1L 40 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.00000000 0.0000000 
18 5G 2L 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.00000000 0.0000000 
19 6G 0L 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.00000000 0.0000000 
20 6G 1L 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.00000000 0.0000000 
21 6G 2L 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.00000000 0.0000000 
      
0.00251783 1.233102 
Line capacity = 160 MW 
     
G = number of generators on outage 
    
L= number of lines on outage 










Probability λ(f/yr) µ(r/yr) 
1 4 20 0.01 1 99 
2 2 30 0.05 3 57 
Total 6 140 
   
 
Table 1.8 Transmission data 
Line 
Connected to 
λ (f/yr) r (hours) 
Rating 
(MVA) Bus Bus 
1 1 2 4 8 80 
2 1 3 5 8 100 
3 2 3 3 10 90 
 
 The transmission line availabilities (A) and unavailabilities (U) for the system 
in Figure 1.5 are given in Table 1.9 using the data from Table 1.8. 
Table 1.9 Transmission line statistics 
Line Availability Unavailability 
1 0.99636033 0.00363967 
2 0.99545455 0.00454545 
3 0.99658703 0.00341297 
 
If the assumption is made that there are no transmission line constraints and that 
connection to sufficient generating capacity is the sole criterion, then: 
Qs = 0.09807433. 
Load 
Figure 1.5 Simple network configuration 
G2 G1 1 
2 3 
  
This value was calculated assuming that the load remains constant at the 110 MW level 
for the entire year. This index can be designated as an annualized value i.e. expressed on an 
annual base. It can be compared with the value of Pg=0.09803430 which is the probability of 
having 30 MW or more out of service in the generation model. The 30 MW outage state is 
considered to represent system failure as there would be some additional transmission loss in 
addition to the 110 MW load. This annualized index is clearly not a true value of the system 
reliability as it does not account for the load variation. It is a simple and very useful index, 
however, for relating and comparing weaknesses in alternative system proposals. 
 




P(Bj) Pg Plj 
Probability 
(System Failure) 
1 0 0.98844633 0.09803430 0 0.09690164 
2 1 0.00361076 0.09803430 0 0.00035398 
3 2 0.00451345 0.09803430 0 0.00044247 
4 3 0.00339509 0.09803430 0 0.00033185 
5 1,2 0,00001649 1.0 0 0.00001649 
6 1,3 0.00001237 1.0 0 0.00001237 
7 2,3 0.00001546 1.0 1 0.00001546 
8 1,2,3 0.00000006 1.0 1 0.00000006 
annualized Qs = 0.09807433 
 
Table 1.10 shows the required transmission and generation state probabilities for the 
no transmission constraint case. 
The load model can be included in the calculation, rather than assuming the load will 
remain at the 110 MW peak value. Under these conditions the Pg and Plj values in Table 1.10 
reduce because the contribution to Qs by lower load levels is less. This can be included using 
conditional probability. 
The calculation of the expected frequency requires, in addition to the data shown in 
Table 1.10 the departure rates for each state. These values together with the state frequencies 














1 0 12 11.861355% 1.16281973 
2 1 1103 3.98266828 0.39043810 
3 2 1102 4.97382190 0.48760515 
4 3 885 2.99580465 0.29369161 
5 1,2 2193 0.03616257 0.03616257 
6 1,3 1976 0.02444312 0.02444312 
7 2,3 1975 0.03053350 0.03053350 
8 1,2,3 3066 0.00018396 0.00018396 
Annualized Fs= 2.42587774 
 
If transmission line overloads conditions result in transmission lines being removed 
from service, then the load point indices increase. This can be illustrated by assuming that 
overload occurs whenever line 2 or 3 is unavailable. Under these conditions, load must be 
curtailed, causing increased load point failures. In this case: 
Qs = 0.10520855 
Fs = 9.61420753 f/yr 
1.4. State selection [40] 
Equations (1.11) and (1.12) consider each generating unit and transmission line as a 
separate element, thereby increasing the flexibility of the approach but simultaneously 
increasing the number of states which must be considered. In this system there are 9 elements 
which represent a total of 512 states. It becomes necessary therefore to limit the number of 
states by selecting the contingencies which will be included. This can be done in several basic 
ways. 
The most direct is to simply specify the contingency level, i.e. first order 
contingencies, second order contingencies etc. This can be modified by neglecting those 
contingencies which have a probability of occurrence less than a certain minimum value. An 
alternative method is to consider those outages which create severe conditions within the 
system. The intention in all methods is to curtail the list of events that can occur in a practical 
system. A useful approach is to consider those outage conditions which result from 
independent events and have a probability exceeding some minimum value and, in addition, 
to consider those outage conditions resulting from outage dependence such as common mode 
  
or station related events again having the same probability constraint. At this stage only 
independent overlapping outages are considered, the problems of outage dependence are not 
considered. 
1.4.1. Application 
The state selection process is illustrated by considering first and second order 
generating unit and transmission line outages in the system shown in Figure 1.5 and using 
Equations (1.11) and (1.12). The unavailability associated with a transmission line is normally 
much lower than that for a generating unit, and therefore a higher order contingency level 
should be used when generating units are considered. The combined generation and 
transmission states are shown in Table 1.12. 
As in Table 1.10 it has been assumed that a loss of 30 MW will result in a load point 
failure due to the transmission loss added to the 110 MW load level. 
The values in Table 1.12 are again for a constant load level of 110 MW and therefore 
are annualized values. The load model can be incorporated in the analysis, however, by 
considering the probability that the load will exceed the capability of each state. The Plj 
values in Table 1.12 will then be modified accordingly and the Qs and Fs indices will be on a 
periodic or annual base. The difference between Fs in Table 1.11 and Table 1.12 would be 
much smaller if the generation reserve margin were increased. 
The effect of transmission line overloading can be illustrated by assuming, that 
overload occurs whenever lines 2 or 3 are unavailable. Under these conditions loads must be 
curtailed, causing increased load point failures. 
Overloading can be eliminated by curtailing or dropping some load to alleviate the 
situation. Use of this technique therefore requires a load flow technique which can 
accommodate it. Load reduction can also be used in the case of an outage condition in the 
generation configuration provided, that the bus-bars at which load will be curtailed are pre-
specified. This is clearly not a problem in a single load example. 
1 . 4 . 2 .  S y s t e m  a n d  l o a d  p o i n t  i n d i c e s 
The system shown in Figure 1.5 is a very simple configuration. In a more practical 
network there are a number of load points and each point has a distinct set of reliability 
indices [37,39]. The basic parameters are the probability and frequency of Composite 
generation and transmission systems Table 1.13 Annualized load point indices failure at the 
  
individual load points, but additional indices can be created from these generic values. The 
individual load point indices can also be aggregated to produce system indices which include, 
in addition to consideration of generation adequacy, recognition of the need to move the 
generated energy through the transmission network to the customer load points. Table 1.13 
lists a selection of load point indices which can be used. 
 

















1 — 0.85692158 18.85227476 0 
  
2 G1 0.03462309 4.15477080 0 
  
3 G1.G1 0.00052449 0.11436062 1.0 0.00052449 0.11436062 
4 G1,G2 0.00364454 0.63414996 1.0 0.00364454 0.63414996 
5 G1.LI 0.00012648 0.15329376 0 
  
6 G1,L2 0.00015810 0.19145910 0 
  
7 G1,L3 0.00011857 0.11774001 0 
  
8 G2 0.09020227 6.85537252 1.0 0.09020227 6.85537252 
9 G2, G2 0.00237374 0.30858620 1.0 0.00237374 0.30858620 
10 G2,L1 0.00032951 0.38783327 1.0 0.00032951 0.38783327 
11 G2,L2 0.00041188 0.48438029 1.0 0.00041188 0.48438029 
12 G2,I3 0.00030891 0.29315559 1.0 0.00030891 0.29315559 
13 L1 0.00313030 3.48402390 0 
  
14 L1,L2 0.00001430 0.03150290 1.0 0.00001430 0.03150290 
15 L1, L3 0.00001072 0.02128992 1.0 0.00001072 0.02128992 
16 L2 0.00391288 4.35112256 0 
  
17 L2,L3 0.00001340 0.02659900 1.0 0.00001340 0.02659900 
18 L3 0.00293466 2.62652070 0 
  
 







Table 1.13 Annualized load point indices 
Basic values 
Probability of failure 
Expected frequency of failure 
Expected number of voltage violations 
Expected number of load curtailments 
Expected load curtailed 
Expected energy not supplied 
Expected duration of load curtailment 
Maximum values 
Maximum load curtailed 
Maximum energy curtailed 
Maximum duration of load curtailment 
Average values 
Average load curtailed 
Average energy not supplied 
Average duration of curtailment 
Bus isolation values 
Expected number of curtailments 
Expected load curtailed 
Expected energy not supplied 
Expected duration of load curtailment 
 
It is important to appreciate that, if these indices are calculated for a single load level 
and expressed on a base of one year, they should be designated as annualized values. 
Annualized indices calculated at the system peak load level are usually much higher than the 
actual annual indices. 
1.5. Distribution System Adequacy Assessment: [1, 40] 
The economic and social effects of loss of electric service have significant impacts on 
both the utility supplying electric energy and the end users of electric service. 
The power system is vulnerable [7] to system abnormalities such as control failures, 
protection or communication system failures, and disturbances, such as lightning, and human 
operational errors. Therefore, maintaining a reliable power supply is a very important issue 
f o r  p o w e r  s y s t e m s  d e s i g n  a n d  o p e r a t i o n . 
This section presents a research efforts and a software implementation of a reliability 
analysis algorithm for electrical power distribution systems. This algorithm is used to study 
  
reliability improvements due to the addition of distributed generators (DGs). This algorithm 
also takes into account system reconfigurations. 
1.5.1 Distributed generators 
When Thomas Edison built the Pearl Street Power Station to provide the first electric 
service to customers in New York City, he was essentially following a strategy that today 
would be called distributed generation – building power generation within the localized area 
of use. As the young industry grew, many industrial facilities built their own power plants 
both to serve their own needs and to sell to customers around them, another example of 
distributed generation. Rapid technological development led to larger and more efficient 
generating plants built farther and farther from the end-user. Large regional power 
transmission networks delivered this power to the local distribution systems and finally to the 
end-user. The industry was regulated so that these changes could occur efficiently without 
wasteful duplication of facilities, and the economic role of distributed generation became 
much more limited. 
Since the 1970s, however, large central nuclear and coal-fired power stations have 
become increasingly expensive and more difficult to site and to build. At the same time 
technological development has improved the cost and performance of smaller, modular power 
generation options -from 300 megawatt (MW) gas-fired combined cycle power plants down to 
individual customer generation of as little as a few kilowatts. 
The industry is also restructuring to allow customers to competitively select the 
optimum combination of energy resources to meet their needs. [9,10] 
 What is distributed generation?  [11], 
Distributed generation or (DG) generally refers to small-scale (typically 1KW –50MW) 
electric power generators that produce electricity at a site close to customers or that are tied to 
an electric distribution system. Distributed generators include synchronous generators, but are 
not limited to them, it comprise induction generators, reciprocating engines, micro-turbines 
(combustion turbines that run on high-energy fossil fuels such as oil, propane, natural gas, 
gasoline or diesel), combustion gas turbines, fuel cells, solar photovoltaic, and wind turbines. 
  
1.5.2. Distributed generation technologies [9,46] 
Energy service providers and consumers can select from a wide range of distributed 
power generation technologies. Commercial technologies such as reciprocating engines and 
small combustion turbines already are used in a variety of applications from emergency power 
to combined heat and power. Emerging technologies such as fuel cells micro-turbines and 
photovoltaic will provide additional options for distributed power generation. 
DGs (also known as Distributed Resources -DRs-) interconnected to the electric power 
system EPS [11,12] come in many forms including gas turbine driven synchronous generators, 
wind powered induction generators, fuel cells with inverter circuitry, and others. 
The use of DGs is projected to grow. This growth is due to cost reductions available 
with DGs. The cost reductions may be the result of released system capacity or reductions in 
generation costs at peak conditions. 
The systems considered in this part are radial operated [24] with respect to substations, 
and are reconfigurable. 
1.5.3. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
 The distribution system is that portion of the electric power system which links the 
bulk power source(s) to the consumer's facilities. Sub-transmission circuit, distribution 
substations, primary feeders, distribution transformers, secondary circuits and consumer 
connections all form different parts of an electric distribution system. Reliability evaluation in 
a distribution system, therefore, deals with how adequately these combined elements perform 
their intended function. Distribution system reliability evaluation techniques have been 
developed and enhanced in the last three decades [15-18, 25-27]. The distribution system is an 
important part of the total electric system as it provides the final link between the bulk system 
and the customers. In many cases, these links are radial in nature and therefore susceptible to 
outage due to a single event. Outages in distribution systems tend to have localized effects to 
overall customer supply inadequacy. An electric distribution system can be generally 
classified into sub-transmission and radial/meshed segments. 
Quantitative reliability evaluation is an essential aspect of distribution system 
planning. Distribution system reliability assessment can be divided into the two basic 
  
segments of measuring past system performance and predicting future performance. Most 
electric power utilities collect data on past system performance and evaluate appropriate 
indices. Predictive reliability evaluation is an attempt to estimate future performance at the 
actual customer load points. These predictions can also be aggregated to provide system 
performance indices. Two sets of reliability indices which are important for individual 
customer load points and for the overall distribution system are defined in the following 
sections. In this research, reliability analysis is not conducted on a complete power system 
and reliability evaluation of the distribution system part is conducted independently of the two 
other parts of the electric power system (generation and transmission segments). This kind of 
analysis generally assumes that the other parts of the system are fully reliable and capable of 
performing their intended functions. [40] 
1.5.4. RADIAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
A distribution circuit normally uses primary or main feeders and lateral distributors. A 
main feeder originates from the sub-transmission substation and passes through the major 
load points and is constructed using single, parallel or meshed circuits. Any distribution 
systems used in practice have a single circuit main feeder and are referred to as radial 
systems. Other systems, although connected as meshed circuits, are normally operated as 
radial systems using normally open points. Radial systems are popular due to their simple 
design and generally low cost. The outage durations due to component failures are reduced by 
protection and switching action is termed as switching/restoration time. In some systems, 
there is provision for an alternate supply in the case of failure or due to a component 
maintenance outage. Fuse-gear, which clears the faults on the lateral distributor or the 
distribution transformer, is also normally present on a lateral distributor. 
1.5.5. DEFINITIONS OF PERFORMANCE INDICES 
A basic problem in distribution system reliability assessment is measuring the efficacy 
of past service. A common solution consists of condensing the effects of service interruptions 
into indices of system performance, which are then used to make decisions. The Edison 
Electric Institute (EEI), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and the 
Canadian Electric Association (CEA) have suggested a wide range of performance indices 
  
[23]. These indices are generally yearly averages of interruption frequency or duration. They 
attempt to capture the magnitude of disturbances by load lost during each interruption. 
System average interruption duration index SAIDI is the average interruption duration 
per customer served. It is determined by dividing the sum of all customer interruption 
durations during a year by the number of customers served. 
      
                                     
                         
                       
Customer average interruption duration index CAIDI is the average interruption 
duration for those customers interrupted during a year. It is determined by dividing the sum of 
all customer interruption durations by the number of customers experiencing one or more 
interruptions during a one-year period. 
      
                                     
                                      
                       
These two performance indices express interruption statistics in terms of system 
customers. A customer here can be an individual, firm, or organization that purchases electric 
services at one location under one rate classification, contract or schedule. If service is 
supplied to a customer at more than one location, each location shall be counted as a separate 
customer. 
1.5.6. COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT SYSTEM DESIGNS 
Of paramount interest in any reliability study is ensuring a good quality of service to 
customers defined as a combination of availability of the energy supply and the quality of the 
energy available to the customers. In the following sections the reliability of the power supply 
for three kinds of situations are discussed and how reconfiguration and alternative sources 
improve the reliability of the power system. 
A. Simple radial distribution system 
Figure 1.6 shows a simple radial distribution system. In this system a single incoming 
power service is received and distributes power to the facility. 
  
 
There is no duplication of equipment and little spare capacity is typically included. 
Failure of any one component in the series path between the source and the load will result in 
a power interruption to at least all loads downstream of the failed component. 
B. Alternative feed distribution arrangement 
A second distribution arrangement is used for facilities requiring more reliable power. 
Figure 1.7 is a diagram representing this system arrangement. Part of the load is connected to 
one source and the other part of the load is connected to a second power source [46]. 
The circuits (one circuit fed by S0 and the other fed by S1) are tied together through a 
normally open tie-switch, with both power sources energized. The electrical equipment is 
designed to accommodate 100% of the facility load. For instance, when a failure occurs in 
source S0, after the failure is isolated by opening the circuit breaker, the tie-switch is closed 
allowing the complete load to be served from a single source until the problem is corrected. 
Most customers can be restored immediately and do not have to wait until S0 is repaired. 
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Figure 1.6  Simple Radial 
Distribution System  
  
C. Alternative feed arrangement with DG 
Reliability can be improved further by adding a DG into the circuit, as indicated in 
Figure 1.8. In case the failure occurs on the left hand side of SW0, switch SW0 is opened and 
SW3 is closed, so that the DG can pick up the rest of the circuit, which was originally fed by 
S0. Without the DG, the power is drown from S1. Such operation might violate system 
constraints or degrade the quality of the power supply, especially when the customer load 
reaches a peak value. 
 
1.5.7. Switching operations  
Reliability analysis for a power system also leads to more reliable and cost-effective 
operation, since power restoration analysis is a subset of the calculations performed for 
reliability analysis. Here switch operation time is assumed to be less than repair time, so loads 
that have lost power may be restored faster by appropriate switching operations, or 
reconfiguration of the system. 
There are two kinds of switching operations of interest. One is isolating the failure 
point so that a load point of interest, which has lost power, may be re-supplied from the 
original source. The other is to again isolate the failure point and to feed a load point of 
interest from an alternate source, if an alternate source is available. 













In essence, there are two configurations in a distribution system. One consists of lines, 
transformers, and other components that are directly responsible for transmitting power from 
the distribution substation to customers. The second one consists of fuses, re-closers, circuit 
breakers, etc. 
This interrelated network is designed to detect unusual conditions on the power 
delivery system and isolate the portions of system that are responsible for these conditions 
from the rest of the network. The location of protection or isolation components on the 
distribution system and their response to failures can have an important impact on the 
reliability indices. The distribution system is sectionalized into segments by these protection 
and isolation components. In the following sections, the power system is not modeled in terms 
of components but segments. A segment is a group of components, whose entry component is 
a switch or a protective device. This sectionalizing device (re-closer, fuse, CB, switch …etc) 
isolates groups of components into indivisible sections. Each segment has only one switch or 
protective device. 
In Figure 1.9, the only protection on the feeder is the station breaker. The failure of 
any of the components in this segment can cause an interruption at load point 1. It is the same 
for the other load points (2, 3, 4, and 5). No temporary restoration is possible. For this 
configuration, the reliability of all the load points (1,2, 3, 4, and 5) is identical. 
A segment’s name is the same as that of its sectionalizing device (re-closer, fuse, CB, 
switch …etc). In Figure 1.9, there is only one segment, which is segment B. Breaker B and 
components 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 all belong to segment B. 
Modeling the power system in terms of segments speeds up the reliability index 
calculations. The algorithm can be programmed to run faster since only the sectionalizing 
devices are processed without processing the intermediate components 
  
 
1.5.8.2. Reliability analysis sets 
In order to analyze the reliability of distribution systems, the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) defined sets [28] which are needed for calculating the reliability of a given 
load point. Figure 1.10 illustrates the relation among these sets. 
In reliability analysis, the failure of all elements that can cause a loss of service to a 
particular load point must be considered. (This load point will be presented in terms of a 
segment, which is the segment of interest S). All system components are either located on the 
continuous path between the source and the segment of interest, or not located on the path. 
The failure of all continuous path components can cause an interruption at the load point. 
The failure of components not in the path can also cause an interruption at the load 
point, unless the component is separated from the path by a protective device that responds 
automatically to the component failure. The effects of non-series elements and temporary 
restoration are now considered in the sets shown in Figure 1.10, as will now be explained.  
The L set, shown in Figure 1.10, contains all segments within a circuit whose failure 
can cause loss of power to the segment of interest S. This L set includes all segments that are 
not separated from the continuous path between the source (substation, generator, etc) and the 














Now the L set is partitioned into the sets SSL and NSSL: 
 The SSL set consists of the segments that may be isolated from the continuous path 
between S and the original source; 
 The NSSL set consists of the segments that cannot be switched away from the continuous 
path between S and the original source. 
The SSL set contains any segments separated from the continuous path by manually 
operated switches. If any element of this set fails, the segment of interest S can be temporarily 
restored from the original source before the failed component is repaired or replaced. 
Examining those segments that cannot be separated from the continuous path, the set 
NSSL is further portioned into SL and NSL: 
 The SL set consists of the segments that can be switched away from the segment of 
interest S, so that if the failure occurs in the SL set, S may be fed by an alternate source; 
 The NSL set consists of the segments that cannot be switched away from the segment of 
interest S. That is the segment of interest itself, so this set only contains the element{S}. 
If anything fails in the NSL set, all the components within that segment have to experience 











Considering the SL set, it can be divided into SAF and NSAF: 
 For the SAF set, if the failed component lies in these segments, it is possible to restore 
power to S by an alternate source; 
 For the NSAF set, if the failed segment belongs to this set, the segment of interest S 
cannot be temporarily restored from an alternate feed. 
The set SAF contains the segments that can be isolated from both the segment of interest S 
and the alternative source, which make the temporary restoration topologically possible. 
Sometimes, system constraints may limit the restoration options; the alternate source might 
not have the capacity to support the particular load point that of interest. So the set SAF is 
partitioned into SF and NSF: 
 The SF set consists of all segments that can be isolated from S and an alternative source, 
allowing power to be restored to S from the alternative source (for segments in this set, 
system constraint violations do not occur during the restoration); 
 The NSF set consists of all segments which may be isolated from S and an alternative 
source, but for which it is not possible to restore power to S because of violating system 
constraints. 
The set L, including all the segments for calculating the reliability indices, is decomposed 
into a number of sets as given by 
NSSLSSLL    (1.17) 
 SSLNSSL    (1.18) 
NSAFSAFSL    (1.19) 
NSFSFSAF    (1.20) 
Equations (1.17)-(1.20) yield 
  NSFNSAFSSFSSLL    (1.21) 
  
To sum up, if the failed component from the L set is placed in the SSL set, it is 
possible to restore power to the load point of interest S from the original source. If the failure 
occurs in the SF set, the power can be restored to S from an alternative source without 
violating system constrains. But, if the failed component locates in either {S} NSAF or NSF 
sets, the failed component must be completely repaired before power can be restored to S. 
Several additional reliability analysis (RA) sets are used to calculate the sets of 
Equation (1,21), as given by  
SIC =  a set of all the segments in the circuit; 
SW =  a set of all the sectionalizing devices in the circuit; 
AF =  a set of available alternate sources; 
IS =  a set of sectionalizing devices that will isolate the segment of interest S from the 
original sources; 
NIS = a set of switches that do not isolate the original source from the segment of interest; 
EC =  a set of ending components for the circuit; 
PD =  a set of protective devices in the circuit that isolate a load point of interest from its 
source. 
1.5.9. Approach to distribution systems reliability evaluation 
1.5.9.1 Circuit model 
Reliability analysis is complicated by a number of factors. One of these factors is the 
size of distribution systems. Large metropolitan areas may contain thousands of devices with 
several separate circuits supplied by different substations. Calculation of reliability for a 
system is an extensive logistical problem. Fundamental to reliability improvement is 
manipulation of large amounts of interrelated data. These data includes distribution system 
configuration, system fault protection, customer density, failure rate, and repair time [29]. The 
  
methods in which data are stored, displayed and modeled determine the effectiveness of the 
computerized method. 
1.5.9.2 Pointers 
The pointer [30] is a variable that holds the address of a data element; pointers permit 
the construction of linked lists of data elements in computer memory [31], pointers are used 
for all data objects. Applications share circuit information via pointers, and also use pointers 
to manipulate data objects hidden inside the applications.  
In distribution systems, a single circuit model may contain thousands of components, 
and an entire system model consisting of hundreds of circuits may contain over a million 
components. With such large systems, modeling methods have a direct impact on the ability 
to perform engineering analysis. 
Use of pointers in linked lists allows system interconnects and equipment parameters 
to be directly available for analysis without repetitive search algorithms. Intrinsic in the 
graphical creation of the circuits is the creation of linked lists. The program memory model 
links together sources and components of each circuit [32]. In this way, it is possible to trace 
from circuit to circuit, through an individual circuit, or through a particular branch of a circuit. 
Application programmers defined objects; these objects are manipulated and accessed 
via pointers and indices into arrays of pointers. The links provided that pertain to component 
traces involved in reliability analysis are: 
 Forward Pointer—forward direction for doubly linked list of circuit components. 
 Backward Pointer— backward direction for doubly linked list of circuit components. 
 Feeder Path Pointer — for a radial system, the feeder path pointer of a given component 
is the next component toward the reference substation that feeds the given component. 
 Brother Pointer — a given component’s brother pointer points to the first component 
connected in its forward path which is not fed by the given component. (It is used to detect 
dead ends or physical jumps in connectivity). 
Because of these contained links and pointers, each component’s data object is known 
as a “trace” structure. 
  
Table 1.14 lists the elements in the trace component structure that are related to the 
reliability analysis module. 
TABLE 1.14  
Program Component Trace Structure Elements 
ELEMENT NAME  DATA TYPE  
Circuit Number Short Integer 
Substation Number Short Integer  
Equipment Index Number Short Integer 
Component type Number Short Integer 
Component Name String 
Forward Pointer Pointer 
Backward Pointer Pointer  
Feeder Path Pointer Pointer 
Brother Pointer Pointer  
Elements Added For Reliability Analysis Module 
Segment Pointer Pointer 
Forward Segment Pointer Pointer 
Backward Segment Pointer Pointer 
Feeder Path Segment Pointer Pointer 
       .     . 
       .     . 
Due to the large size of the trace structure only the elements, which are employed by 
the reliability analysis module are listed in Table 1.14. Several segment trace pointers are 
included in the structure. The Segment Pointer is used to find the primary sectionalizing 
device (re-closer, fuse, CB, switch …etc) for a component. 
Sectionalizing devices in a circuit are linked in a doubly linked list via the Forward 
Segment Pointer and the Backward Segment Pointer. Sectionalizing devices are also linked 
with the Feeder Path Segment Pointer, which is similar to the Feeder Path pointer for 
components, except that only sectionalizing devices are processed. 
1.5.9.3 Circuit traces 
Circuit traces [28] are applied in determining the reliability analysis (RA) sets shown 
in Figure 1.10. Circuit traces employ pointers and linked lists discussed previously. Circuit 
traces represent the order in which an algorithm processes the components of the system. As 
indicated earlier, a circuit analysis program must efficiently manage large quantities of system 
and equipment data. The pointers and linked lists compact the data storage and reduce 
a l g o r i t h m  e x e c u t i o n  t i m e . 
  
Here an overview of using circuit traces is provided. Figure 1.11 is an example circuit 
used to illustrate the application of circuit traces. Source S0 is the original source of the circuit 
of interest, and S1 is the alternate source. S1 is separated from the circuit of interest by the 
normally open switch SW25. 
 
Each circuit trace represents a particular linked list tracing through the components of 
a circuit. Four types of component circuit traces will be applied. These traces, along with the 
notation used to indicate the trace, are defined as follows: 
FTm = forward component trace beginning with component m (if m is not specified, FT 
begins from the substation). FT in the example circuit is given by: 
 
302928Fus 876 5 SW4 3 2 FT  (1.22) 
BTm =  b a c k w a r d  c o m p o n e n t  t r a c e  b e g i n n i n g  w i t h  m ;  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  b y : 
BT15= SW14→ 13→ 12→ SW11→ …→Fus7→6→5→SW4→3→2→1 (1.23) 








































FPT15= SW14→ 6→ 2→ B1   (1.24) 
ECT = ending component trace, is given by: 
ECT= 5→ 9→ 13→ 17→18→19→20→21→29→30                            (1.25) 
The circuit traces discussed above are basic circuit traces. For reliability analysis, it is 
more efficient to work with pointers to segments and to perform traces based on these 
pointers. The segment circuit traces used in this research are: 
FSTm = forward segment trace from segment m, (if m is not specified, the forward 
trace will begin with the substation). In the example circuit, FST is given by: 
FST= SW4→ Fus7→ SW11→ SW14→SW16→ SW23→ Fus28 (1.26) 
FPSTm =  feeder path segment trace (It is performed relative to a given segment 
m). For instance, tracing from the segment of interest, segment SW16, FPSTSW16 is given by: 
FPSTSW16= SW14→ B1  (1.27) 
AFT = alternative feed trace. In the example circuit, there is only one alternative 
source, so AFT is given by 
AFT= SW25   (1.28) 
If there are more than one alternative feed for the circuit, then AFT would consist of 
the linked list of all alternative feeds. 
1.5.10. Computer algorithm 
1.5.10.1. General 
This section presents the computer algorithm used to develop the reliability analysis 
(RA) sets. The algorithm is implemented with linked lists; the implementation is pulled off by 
u s i n g  t h e  M A T L A B  p a c k a g e . 
A notation in terms of linked lists is introduced to describe the algorithm. A software 
design for implementing the algorithm is also discussed. Along with the presentation of the 
  
algorithm, the example circuit illustrated in Figure 1.11 is used to explain the development of 
the RA sets. 
1.5.10.2 Algorithm 
In what follows, it is assumed for the example circuit that the segment of interest is 
given by:                                    {S}={Sw16}    (1.29) 
First a forward component trace (FCT) is conducted, beginning with the substation, so 
that the set SW and segment pointers can be determined. This can be expressed as 
FCT→SW, pFSeg, pBSeg, pSeg      (1.30) 
Where 
pFSeg = pointer to forward segment (in the example circuit, segment B1’s pFSeg pointer 
is pointed to segment SW14) 
pBSeg = pointer to backward segment (in the example circuit, segment SW14’s pBseg 
pointer is pointed to segment B1) 
pSeg = pointer to segment device for component (in the example circuit, all the 
components in segment SW16, components 17, 18 and 19, have their pSeg pointed to SW16). 
The expression (1.30) is read as the Forward Component Trace (FCT) yields the SW 
set and sets the pointers pFSeg, pBSeg, and pSeg. Note that the notation used here is always to 
have pointers begin with a small ‘p’. 
For the example circuit, 
SW= {B1, SW4, Fu7, SW11, SW14, SW16, SW23, Fu28, SW25} (1.31) 
In the FCT, the ending components that make up the EC set can also defined, by using 
the following condition: 
If a component’s forward pointer points to its brother pointer [20], then this 
component is an ending component. 
Thus,                      FCT →EC                                     (1.32) 
  
There is a set of pointers representing the list of existing alternate feeds, AF, which 
can be set up during the FCT as well. If a component’s adjacent component, say component 
A, belongs to another circuit and is fed by another substation, it means the original circuit is 
connected to an alternative feed. Once such a component as A is found, the source for A can 
be traced via an FPST. In this way, all the available alternate sources can be collected. Thus: 
FCT →AF                                            (1.33) 
Note that for each segment stored in the AF set, there are two ending components. 
One corresponds to a component in the EC set, and the other component exists in the adjacent 
circuit. 
Since IS consists of all the sectionalizing devices in the feeder path of S, a FPSTs can 
be used to obtain the IS set, as well as the PD (protective device) set, as given by: 
FPSTs →IS, PD                     (1.34) 
For the segment of interest S in the example circuit: 
IS={SW16, SW14, B1}          (1.35) 
PD={B1}                                 (1.36) 
The logic used to develop the L set is as follows: 
 Perform an FST, when the FST encounters a segment whose primary protective device 
belongs to the PD set, this segment is in the L set. 
 Otherwise, when the FST encounters a segment whose primary protective device does not 
belong to the PD set, the segment is not in the L set. 
Thus,                           FST→L                                   (1.37) 
Following the steps described above, the L set for the segment of interest S is obtained. 
L={B1, SW4, SW11, SW14, SW16, SW23}   (1.38) 
  
The segments in the SSL set may be isolated from S and the original source, so that the 
power can be restored from the original source. SSL is given by the following set operations 
as:                                      SSL= L ∩ NIS         (1.39) 
Where NIS =SW- IS. 
Applying Equation (1.39) in the example circuit, and using expressions (1.31), (1.35) 
and (1.38), the result is: 
SSL= {SW4, SW11, SW23} (1.40) 
The NSL set has only one element – the segment of interest S. All the failed 
components in the segment of interest must be completely repaired before power can be 
restored to S. 
The segments in the SL set can be switched away from the segment of interest S, so 
that if the failure occurs in the SL set, S may be fed from an alternative source. The SL set is 
given by the following set operation. 
SL= L ∩ IS-{S} (1.41) 
In the example circuit, applying expressions (3.8), (3.14) and (3.17), this gives: 
 14SW,1BSL   (1.42) 
If the failed component lies in the SAF set, it is possible to restore power to S when 
system constraints are not violated. The system constraints that are of interest here are the 
power handling capabilities of the equipment.  
Of particular interest is the remaining power handling capability of each piece of 
equipment. In order to find the SAF set, we conduct feeder path segment traces both from an 
alternate source and the segment of interest S, FPSTAF and FPSTS, respectively. When these 
traces encounter a common path, then the SAF set is not empty. The SAF set includes the 
segments in the common path except the first segment that the feeder path traces meet in the 
common path. Thus, 
SAF FPST,FPST SAF   (1.43) 
  
In the example circuit, 
 B1SAF   (1.44) 
The NSAF set includes all the segments for which it is not possible to restore power to 
S from an alternative source. All the failed components in these segments must be completely 
repaired before restoring power to S. 
The NSAF set is given by set operation: 
SAFSLNSAF   (1.45) 
In the example circuit, using expression (3.21) and (3.23), this yields: 
 SW14NSAF   (1.46) 
The segments in the SF set may be isolated from S and an alternative source, so that 
power can be restored to S from the alternative source without violating system constraints. 
The NSF set includes all the segments which may be isolated from S and an 
alternative source, but for which it is not possible to restore power to S because of system 
constraint violations. All the failed components in these segments must be completely 
repaired before power can be restored to S. 
To achieve the SF set, the power required by S must be compared to the minimum 
remaining capacity of the components along the feeder path from the alternative feed (AF).  
If there is more than one alternative feed in the system, the minimum capacities 
encountered in the feeder path component traces FPTAF for all the available sources in the AF 
set must be compared. For instance, there are n alternative feeds in the system. Let: 
CAFK = minimum remaining component power capacity in the FPTAF for the k
th alternative 
feed, k=1,2,3…n.                                       (1.47) 
 AFK
k
AFm CmaxC        (1.48) 
  
Thus CAFm represents the greatest minimum remaining capacity available among the 
alternative sources. For example, as demonstrated in Figure 1.12, there are two alternative 
sources, AF1 and AF2. The segment of interest is marked as S. As indicated in the figure, the 
power required by S is 5 KW. The numbers on the alternative feed components stand for the 
remaining capacity (units of KW) of the components. 
According to Equation (1.47) and (1.48), 
  530 5, 10,minC AF1 
 
  1010 20, 20, 40,minC AF2 
 
 2AFAF1AFm C,CmaxC    1010,5max 
 
So                        2m
AFAF 
                                                         (1.49) 
Even though the minimum remaining capacity on the feeder path from AF1 is equal to 
the required power in S, pulling the power from AF1 to S will fully utilize component AF12. 
Thus AF2 is chosen since it has more remaining capacity on the feeder path.  
In the general case, the segment of interest is not directly connected to the alternative 
feeds. So FPT traces in the circuit of interest are also required to determine remaining power 
handling capabilities. In essence, component traces from the segment of interest to all 
alternative sources are required to check power handling capacities. In summary, the circuit 























Summary of Traces Used To Develop The RA Sets 
ALGORITHM 
STEPS  TRACES IN THE CIRCUIT MODEL 
Step 1 FCT → SW, pFSeg, pBSeg, pSeg, EC, AF 
Step 2 FPSTS → IS, PD 
Step 3 FST → L  
Step 4 FPSTAF, FPSTS → SAF 
Step 5 FPTAF → SF or NSF 
In order to get the required power or remaining capacity of a component, a power flow 
needs to be calculated. 
Once the power flow calculation is completed, then 
NSF or SFFPTAF                      (1.50) 
In the example circuit, assuming system constraints are not violated, 
    1BSF                    (1.51) 
1.5.11. Reliability indices 
This analysis relies on two general classes of information to estimate the reliability; 
component reliability parameters and system structure. Using system structure and component 
performance data, the reliability of specific load points or the whole distribution system can 
be evaluated. The structure information is achieved by the circuit traces presented previously. 
In the following paragraphs the performance data is discussed. 
Predictive reliability techniques suffer from data collection difficulties. Simplifying 
assumptions (default values) are required for practical analysis of distribution systems. 
1.5.11.1 Functional characterization  
The availability of component functionally is characterized by the following indices: 
• Annual Failure Rate = the annual average frequency of failure, 
  
• Annual Down Time = the annual outage duration experienced at a load point also known as 
unavailability U. 
The failure rate for segment i, FRi, is the sum of the failure rates of all the components 








         (1.52) 
Where: Frj = the failure rate for component j, and 
n = the number of components in segment i. 


















       (1.53) 
Where 
 Frj = the failure rate for component j, 
 Repj = the average repair time for component j, and 
 n = the number of components in segment i. 
These indices are computed for each segment in the feeder. All load points within a 
segment have the same failure rate and experience the same down time.  
In the reliability analysis program, failure rates and repair times from field data are 
preferred. When this data is not available, default values are fetched from a table in the 




1.5.11.2 Reliability indices calculation 
After finding the reliability analysis sets for the segment of interest S, reliability 
indices can be calculate. First assume there is a single failure incident. 










iis )SOTFR()REPFR(DT                             (1.54) 
Where, 
   SOTi = switch operation time to re-supply segment S due to the failure of segment i. 
Note that the reliability analysis algorithm presented here assumes that switch 
operations can always be performed faster than repairs.  
The customer average interruption duration index (CAIDI) for a segment is the same 
as DTs 
sDT  CAIDI          (1.55) 
Once the down time for each segment is calculated, and given the number of 
customers attached to each segment, the total customer down time, DTC, for a given circuit 






     
     (1.56) 
Where Ci = the number of customers attached to segment i. 
Since the failure rate and down time is known at each segment on the feeder, the 







SAIDI  (1.57) 
  










RT  (1.58) 
1.5.11.3. Relative reliability index 
A new measure of reliability referred to as ‘Relative_CAIDI’ is introduced here. 





AIDIjRelative_C   (1.59) 
Where  CAIDIckt = average CAIDI for the circuit of interest. 
       CAIDIj = CAIDI for segment j. 
Thus: 
 If Relative_CAIDIj = 1, then the customers in segment j have average reliability 
 If Relative_CAIDIj <1, then the reliability of the customers in segment j is less than 
average. 
 If Relative_CAIDIj >1, then customers in segment j have reliability better than average. 
Extra reliability indices [44] for the distribution system can exist such as the ASAI and 
ASUI as designated below: 
 
Average service availability index, ASAI: 
     
                                   
                       
                       
Average service unavailability index ASUI: 
             
                                     
                       
                       
  
1.5.12. Distributed generator placement 
In the evolving energy industry, emerging distributed generator technologies have the 
potential to provide attractive, practical, and economical generation options for energy 
companies and their customers. 
Distributed resource technologies range in size from 3-10 KW for residential systems to 
50-500 KW for commercial users to 1-50 MW in the industrial market segment. Primary 
opportunities lie in using these technologies to 
1. Improve the service and delivery of energy to end users 
2. Support the operation and management of transmission and distribution systems. 
This work does not consider the islanding of distributed generators (that is the 
generator operating without substation supply). 
A distributed generator is often placed at a substation because no further land 
purchases are needed. However, locating generators at substations, distributed generator acts 
only as a backup power source, which may not contribute significant reliability improvement 
as far as the entire system is concerned. Instead, generators located further out on a circuit can 
often significantly affect system reliability. It is necessary to evaluate the effects of different 
placements of distributed generators. It will be seen that locating the DG at the end of the 
circuit produces more reliability improvement than placing it at the substation. 
1.5. Summary 
The chapter in here presents the basic concepts associated with composite system 
adequacy assessment, also known as the HLII adequacy assessment. Reliability indices for 
load points and for all the entire system are initiated. States selection techniques are 
presented. Numerical examples are used to illustrate the application of the assessment 
techniques on the HLII level. 
The chapter in addition, presents the concepts of the techniques used in distribution 
system reliability evaluation; reliability analysis component are introduced as reliability 
analysis sets, pointers, circuit traces and segments. At this stage of the work, it was assumed 
that the HLII level is 100% reliable. Indices concerning load points and the complete 
  
distribution system are described. Distributed generation technologies are introduced, and 
used in here, for the improvement of distribution system reliability [43]. Moreover in this 














































 The concepts outlined in chapter 1 are utilized in this chapter to predict the reliability 
indices for overall power system. The test system used throughout this section to illustrate the 
basic concepts and procedures involved in the overall power system reliability analysis. 
2.2. Test System 
 The application in this section uses the well-known (R.B.T.S). The detailed 
descriptions of these systems are given in [32-34]. The (R.B.T.S) is an educational test system 
developed by the Power Systems Research Group at the University of Saskatchewan. The 
(R.B.T.S) is sufficiently small to permit the conduct of a large number of reliability studies 
with a reasonable solution time yet sufficiently detailed to reflect the actual complexities 
involved in a practical reliability analysis. 
The single line diagram of the (R.B.T.S) is shown in Figure 2.1. The (R.B.T.S) 
described has two generation buses, five load buses (one of which is also a generation bus), 
nine transmission lines and eleven generating units. The total installed capacity is 240MW 
with a system peak load of 185MW. The transmission voltage level is 230KV. The minimum 
and the maximum ratings of the generating units are 5 MW and 40 MW respectively. The 
detailed generator data, bus data and station data for this system are given here after. 
The generating unit ratings and reliability data for the RBTS are shown in Table 2.1. 
 
























05 hydro 2 0.010 4380 2 45 198 2 
10 thermal 1 0.020 2190 4 45 196 2 
20 hydro 4 0.015 3650 2.4 55 157.6 2 
20 thermal 1 0.025 1752 5 45 195 2 
40 hydro 1 0.020 2920 3 60 147 2 
40 thermal 2 0.030 1460 6 45 194 2 
 
Table 2.2 shows the basic transmission line reliability data. The permanent outage rate 





Figure 2.1: Single line diagram of The R.B.T.S 
  









r (hr) From To 
1 1 3 75 1.5 10.0 
2 2 4 250 5.0 10.0 
3 1 2 200 4.0 10.0 
4 3 4 50 1.0 10.0 
5 3 5 50 1.0 10.0 
6 1 3 75 1.5 10.0 
7 2 4 250 5.0 10.0 
8 4 5 50 1.0 10.0 
9 5 6 50 1.0 10.0 
2.3. HLII reliability indices for the R.B.T.S 
Reliability studies and analysis are based on the probability theory, they are not made 
for having just numerical results for different system configuration, and based on these results 
the engineers will opt and select one system configuration because of the good probability 
percentage of that case. In fact and real applications, that numerical results obtained from the 
studies represent the other face of information contained in that numerical outcome, in 
another word, numerical calculation are the compressed form of the information for the 
system in case of study. 
Reliability indices for the composite system in favor of the R.B.T.S at buses 2-6 are 
represented in tables (2.3)-(2.7). 
The tables in here after, point up the indices either for every state in the analysis of the 
concerned bus (column: 1 to 14) and the indices for the load connected to that bus (overall 
indices of the bus), (column: 15 to 17 and the last line of the tables). 
The nine (9) first columns are reserved to the system states, they furnish information 
on all the possibilities for all the lines of the transmission system, it is like a logical code, each 
line can exist in to states (up or down) zeros (0) mean that the line is operational (up), i.e., 
there is no fault in that line; if it is one (1) i.e., the line is out of service because of a fault 
(down). 
In addition the tables display the failure probability and the failure frequency for each 
state which can emerge from that system state. The Pg column presents the generation 
probability with respect to the load of the bus bar. 
The tables outlined afterward are not truncated to a sensitive percentage level; they are 
just samples from the whole states of the system. The real number of the transmission line 
  
system states is (29 = 512). These tables are put to give for the reader comprehensible ideas on 
the results and the evaluation of the reliability. 
From the application on R.B.T.S the results in the tables below, it is find that the 
displayed results are not the complete results as it was introduced later, they are selected from 
the (29 = 512) states to be interpreted for the reader as examples. The discussion and the 
explanation of the whole resultants states (29 = 512) is done here after. 
For a general view, it can be seen that Bus 2 is both a generation and a load bus and 
this proves to be the most reliable load bus in the network. Bus 3 is connected directly to Bus 
1 by two transmission lines on separate circuits. Bus 4 is supplied by two lines. Bus 5 is 
supplied by a two transmission lines, while Bus 6 is supplied by only one line. 
From the tables below (last line of the tables), the indices at Bus 2 are less sensitive to 
supply failure, as Bus 2 is also a generating bus. Similarly those at Bus 3, which is strongly 
connected to a generating bus, are also virtually insensitive in comparison with Bus 4. It can 
be seen that buses 3 and 4 have the same configuration and the sole difference is the length of 
lines (1 and 6) which is less than that of lines (2 and 7); this difference in line length affect the 
failure rate of the lines which is traduced in reliability in difference in failure rate and 
availability of the supply. On the other hand, Bus 5 and Bus 6 are extremely sensitive to the 
loss of power delivery at the load points. In another word, more the load is distant from the 
supply points then the reliability is more sensitive to the number of elements between the load 
point and the supply point, the raison is that additional elements indices (failure rates and 
unavailability) are used in the calculation. 
Here after individual flash for the buses are made: 
Apropos Bus 2, it can be observed on table 2.3 that whatever all the transmission lines 
are failed (line 2: in grey) and there is no way to bring power from Bus 1 it steel possible to 
supply the load point at Bus 2 form the plant connected at this bus itself, this is why Bus 2 is 
the more reliable in the network. 
Because of having the same analysis of the results of the other buses 3, 4, 5 and 6 
investigations for bus 6 are given in detail: 
Table 2.7 spots that there are four (4) major cases: 
First case: There is possibility to supply the load point from both stations, station 1 at bus 
1, and station 2 at Bus 2. In this case there will be a failure at the load point 6 
only and only if a failure of supplying electric power takes place. 
This can be observed on the three first lines on table 2.7. 
  
In this case Pg= 2.28E-14 (the probability of having power production less or 
equal to 20 MW - having more than 220 MW out of service) is used in the 
calculation. 
In this case there are: 120 states on 512 total system states. 
Second case: Bus 6 is isolated (there is no connectivity between the supply points and the 
load point at bus 6), see the cases: 
 Failure of line 9 alone 
 Failure of lines 5 and 8 
 Failure of lines 1, 6, 2 and 7. 
In this case Pg=1 (100% probability of failure at bus 6) is used in the 
calculation. 
In this case there are: 344 states on 512 total system states. 
Third case: The power plant at bus 1 is isolated (there is no connectivity between Bus 1 
and the load point at bus 6), see the cases: 
 Failure of lines 1, 6 and 3 
 Failure of lines 3, 4 and 5. 
In this case there will be a failure at the load point 6 only if a failure of 
supplying electric power from the power plant at bus 2 occurs. 
In this case Pg=1.04E-09 (the probability of having power production -from 
power plant at bus 2- less or equal to 20 MW - having more than 110 MW out 
of service), this probability is used in the calculation. 
In this case there are: 24 states on 512 total system states. 
Fourth case: The power plant at bus 2 is isolated (there is no connectivity between Bus 2 
and the load point at bus 6), see the cases: 
 Failure of lines 3, 2 and 7 
 Failure of lines 3, 4 and 8. 
In this case there will be a failure at the load point 6 only if it is impossible to 
bring electric power from the power plant at bus 1. 
In this case Pg=4.01E-05 (the probability of having power production -from 
power plant at bus 1- less or equal to 20 MW - having more than 90 MW out of 
service), this probability is used in the calculation. 
In this case there are: 24 states on 512 total system states. 
  
 As said before bus 6 have the lowest reliability level in the network system, and this is 
because that Bus 6 will be completely isolated from the supply 344 times i.e., Bus 6 will be in 
an isolated state (failure state) 344 times on 512 states of the total system states, which 
represent 67.1875% of the 512 states of the system where bus 6 will be isolated completely 
from the supply points, all the engineer work will be made on taking the necessary actions to 
study how to make these states (weak points) to not came out. This can be done for example 
by doing the necessary maintenance in time period, to provide an alternative feed to bus 6. 
Behind this exposition of the results from the reliability analysis of the case study of 
R.B.T.S, it can be said that any kind of information needed for the system planning can be 
extract from this study, like the composition of system states failure of transmission lines, 
generator units states which lead to failure of supply, their failure rates, unavailability for 
every state, any kind of be details can be pulled out if it is required to find out the weak points 
in the system. And after the collection of information the engineers can take the necessary 





 Table 2.3: HLII Load points indices for the RBTS at Bus 2 



















L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.976354 20.50343 2.28E-14 2.23E-14 4.67E-13 6.47E-12 2.70E-09 1.95E-10 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7.22E-25 5.69E-21 1.04E-09 7.50E-34 5.92E-30 7.39E-29 8.22E-29 6.57E-30 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 4.32E-17 2.27E-13 1.04E-09 4.49E-26 2.36E-22 2.95E-21 4.91E-21 3.93E-22 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2.18E-09 5.76E-06 2.28E-14 4.96E-23 1.31E-19 1.82E-18 6.02E-18 4.35E-19 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1.31E-08 3.45E-05 1.04E-09 1.36E-17 3.59E-14 4.48E-13 1.49E-12 1.19E-13 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1.49E-11 5.24E-08 1.04E-09 1.55E-20 5.45E-17 6.81E-16 1.70E-15 1.36E-16 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1.49E-11 5.24E-08 1.04E-09 1.55E-20 5.45E-17 6.81E-16 1.70E-15 1.36E-16 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1.70E-14 7.47E-11 1.04E-09 1.77E-23 7.77E-20 9.71E-19 1.94E-18 1.55E-19 
Unavailability at the bus is: U= 1.39E-10 h 
Failure Frequency is: λ= 9.55E-13 occ/yr 









Table 2.4: HLII Load points indices for the RBTS at Bus 3 



















L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.976354 20.50343 5.10E-08 4.98E-08 1.05E-06 6.73E-05 2.81E-02 4.36E-04 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2.86E-06 0.005065 5.10E-08 1.46E-13 2.58E-10 1.66E-08 8.23E-08 1.28E-09 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3.27E-09 8.64E-06 5.10E-08 1.67E-16 4.41E-13 2.83E-11 9.39E-11 1.46E-12 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3.73E-12 1.31E-08 1 3.73E-12 1.31E-08 1.12E-06 2.78E-06 3.27E-08 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 4.25E-15 1.87E-11 1 4.25E-15 1.87E-11 1.59E-09 3.17E-09 3.73E-11 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 4.25E-15 1.87E-11 1 4.25E-15 1.87E-11 1.59E-09 3.17E-09 3.73E-11 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1.31E-08 3.45E-05 0.001587 2.07E-11 5.48E-08 2.99E-06 9.91E-06 1.82E-07 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1.49E-11 5.24E-08 0.001587 2.37E-14 8.32E-11 4.54E-09 1.13E-08 2.07E-10 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1.49E-11 5.24E-08 0.001587 2.37E-14 8.32E-11 4.54E-09 1.13E-08 2.07E-10 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1.66E-10 5.82E-07 0.05957 9.87E-12 3.47E-08 1.55E-06 3.86E-06 8.65E-08 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1.66E-10 5.82E-07 0.05957 9.87E-12 3.47E-08 1.55E-06 3.86E-06 8.65E-08 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1.89E-13 8.29E-10 0.05957 1.13E-14 4.94E-11 2.20E-09 4.40E-09 9.87E-11 
Unavailability  is U= 3.83E-04 h 
Failure Frequency is: λ= 1.51E-05 occ/yr 





   Table 2.5: HLII Load points indices for the RBTS at Bus 4 



















L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.976354 20.50343 6.90E-12 6.73E-12 1.41E-10 4.17E-09 1.74E-06 5.90E-08 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.36E-06 0.011238 6.90E-12 4.39E-17 7.75E-14 2.29E-12 1.13E-11 3.84E-13 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 7.26E-09 1.92E-05 6.90E-12 5.01E-20 1.32E-16 3.90E-15 1.29E-14 4.39E-16 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1.06E-13 4.67E-10 1 1.06E-13 4.67E-10 1.87E-08 3.73E-08 9.32E-10 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1.21E-16 6.39E-13 1 1.21E-16 6.39E-13 2.56E-11 4.25E-11 1.06E-12 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1.06E-13 4.67E-10 1 1.06E-13 4.67E-10 1.87E-08 3.73E-08 9.32E-10 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1.31E-08 3.45E-05 2.70E-07 3.52E-15 9.31E-12 2.41E-10 8.00E-10 3.09E-11 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1.49E-11 5.24E-08 2.70E-07 4.02E-18 1.41E-14 3.67E-13 9.13E-13 3.52E-14 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1.49E-11 5.24E-08 2.70E-07 4.02E-18 1.41E-14 3.67E-13 9.13E-13 3.52E-14 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1.66E-10 5.82E-07 0.000929 1.54E-13 5.40E-10 1.26E-08 3.15E-08 1.35E-09 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1.89E-13 8.29E-10 0.000929 1.76E-16 7.71E-13 1.80E-11 3.59E-11 1.54E-12 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1.89E-13 8.29E-10 0.000929 1.76E-16 7.71E-13 1.80E-11 3.59E-11 1.54E-12 
Unavailability  is U= 2.30E-06 h 
Failure Frequency is:  λ= 8.36E-07 
occ/yr 




Table 2.6: HLII Load points indices for the RBTS at Bus 5 



















L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.976354 20.50343 2.28E-14 2.23E-14 4.67E-13 6.47E-12 2.70E-09 1.95E-10 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6.36E-06 0.011238 2.28E-14 1.45E-19 2.56E-16 3.55E-15 1.76E-14 1.27E-15 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2.43E-17 1.28E-13 2.28E-14 5.53E-31 2.91E-27 4.04E-26 6.71E-26 4.85E-27 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1.27E-06 0.002252 1 1.27E-06 0.002252 0.045046 0.222814 0.011141 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1.27E-06 0.002252 1 1.27E-06 0.002252 0.045046 0.222814 0.011141 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1.06E-13 4.67E-10 1 1.06E-13 4.67E-10 9.33E-09 1.86E-08 9.32E-10 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1.31E-08 3.45E-05 1.04E-09 1.36E-17 3.59E-14 4.48E-13 1.49E-12 1.19E-13 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1.49E-11 5.24E-08 1.04E-09 1.55E-20 5.45E-17 6.81E-16 1.70E-15 1.36E-16 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1.49E-11 5.24E-08 1.04E-09 1.55E-20 5.45E-17 6.81E-16 1.70E-15 1.36E-16 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1.89E-13 8.29E-10 4.01E-05 7.58E-18 3.32E-14 3.32E-13 6.64E-13 6.64E-14 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1.89E-13 8.29E-10 4.01E-05 7.58E-18 3.32E-14 3.32E-13 6.64E-13 6.64E-14 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2.16E-16 1.14E-12 4.01E-05 8.65E-21 4.55E-17 4.55E-16 7.57E-16 7.57E-17 
Unavailability is U= 0.0114 h  
Failure Frequency is: λ= 0.0023 occ/yr 
Total (results for the bus)= 1.30E-06 0.0023 0.0465 0.2277 0.0114 
 




Table 2.7: HLII Load points indices for the RBTS at Bus 6 



















L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.976354 20.50343 2.28E-14 2.23E-14 4.67E-13 6.47E-12 2.70E-09 1.95E-10 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1.09E-08 2.88E-05 2.28E-14 2.48E-22 6.56E-19 9.08E-18 3.01E-17 2.17E-18 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6.36E-06 0.011238 2.28E-14 1.45E-19 2.56E-16 3.55E-15 1.76E-14 1.27E-15 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.001114 0.998426 1 0.001114 0.998426 19.96852 195.228 9.761398 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1.27E-06 0.002252 1 1.27E-06 0.002252 0.045046 0.222814 0.011141 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 9.32E-11 3.27E-07 1 9.32E-11 3.27E-07 6.55E-06 1.63E-05 8.17E-07 
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1.31E-08 3.45E-05 1.04E-09 1.36E-17 3.59E-14 4.48E-13 1.49E-12 1.19E-13 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5.81E-09 1.53E-05 1.04E-09 6.03E-18 1.59E-14 1.99E-13 6.61E-13 5.29E-14 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1.45E-07 0.000383 4.01E-05 5.82E-12 1.53E-08 1.53E-07 5.09E-07 5.09E-08 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 5.81E-09 1.53E-05 4.01E-05 2.33E-13 6.15E-10 6.15E-09 2.04E-08 2.04E-09 
Unavailability is : U= 9.9977 h 
Failure Frequency is: λ= 1.0464 occ/yr 
Total (results for the bus)= 0.0011 1.0464 20.9272 199.9539 9.9977 
  
 
2.4. Distribution system reliability evaluation: Application on the 
R . B . T . S  " R o y  B i l l i n t o n  t e s t  s y s t e m " 
2.4.1. Development of distribution networks for The R.B.T.S 
 The R.B.T.S has 5 load bus bars (BUS2-BUS-6). Two distribution networks were 
developed at the bus bars 2 and 4 [32-34]. The distribution network at the bus 3 of the R.B.T.S 
represents a typical industrial and large user distribution system with a peak load of 85MW. 
Bus 3 has industrial, large users, office buildings, residential and commercial customers. The 
distribution network at the bus 5 represents a typical urban type network consisting of 
residential, government and industrial, office building, and commercial customers. The peak 
load of the distribution system at bus 5 is 20 MW. The distribution network at bus 6 is a 
typical rural network with agricultural, small industrial, commercial and residential 
customers. The peak load of this network is 20 MW. The distribution networks at buses 2, 3, 4 








































Figure 2.6.: Distribution system at bus 6: R.B.T.S 
  
 
2.4.2 Customer data for the R.B.T.S 
 The customer data of the network shown in figure 2.1 at buses 3, 5, and 6 are given in 
Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10. The details of feeder data at buses 3, 5 and 6 are given in Tables 2.11, 
2.12 and 2.13. The lengths of the feeder sections are presented in Table 2.14. The design of the 
distribution networks for bus 3, 5, and 6 of the R.B.T.S follow general utility principals and 
practices regarding topology, component ratings and loading levels [1]. 
TABLE 2.8 











15 1,4-7,20,24,32,36. Residential 250 
5 11,12,13,18,25. Residential 230 
4 2,15,26,30. Residential 190 
3 39,40,44. Large Users 1 
3 41-43. Large Users 1 
3 8,9,10. Small Industrial 1 
9 3,16,17,19,28,29,31,37,38. Commercial 15 
2 14,27. Office And Buildings 1 
















4 1-2,20,21 Residential 210 
4 4,6,15,25 Residential 240 
5 26,9-11,13 Residential 195 
5 3,5,8,17,23 Government and Inst 1 
5 7,14,18,22,24 Commercial 15 
3 12,16,19 Office Buildings 1 
  TOTAL 2858 
 
TABLE 2.10 











3 1,3,9. Residential 138 
4 1,4,11,19. Residential 126 
2 5,6. Residential 118 
5 7,8,10,18,23. Residential 147 
3 12,13,22. Residential 132 
4 25,28,31,36. Residential 79 
4 27,29,33,39. Residential 76 
2 14,17. Commercial 10 
1 15. Small 1 
1 16. Small 1 
2 32,37. Farm 1 
3 20,30,34. Farm 1 
2 21,35. Farm 1 
2 24,40. Farm 1 
2 26,38. Farm 1 
















FEEDER DATA FOR THE R.B.T.S BUS 5 
FEEDE
R NUMBER  
LOAD POINTS 
NUMBER 
OF CUSTOMERS  
F1 1-7. 917 
F2  8-13. 782 
F3  14-19 273 
F4  20-26. 886 
 TOTAL 2858 
TABLE 2.13 
FEEDER DATA FOR THE R.B.T.S BUS 6 
FEEDE
R NUMBER  
LOAD POINTS 
NUMBER 
OF CUSTOMERS  
F1 1-6. 764 
F2  7-13. 969 
F3  14-17. 22 
F4  18-40. 1183 
 TOTAL 2938 
 
TABLE 2.11 
FEEDER DATA FOR THE R.B.T.S BUS 3 
FEEDE
R NUMBER  
LOAD POINTS 
NUMBER 
OF CUSTOMERS  
F1 1-7. 1455 
F2  8-10. 3 
F3  11-17. 681 
F4  18-24. 1495 
F5  25-31. 656 
F6  32-38. 1280 
F7  39-41. 3 
F8  42-44. 3 
 TOTAL 5806 
TABLE 2.14 











FEEDER SECTION NUMBERS  
BUS 3   
1 0.6 1 2 3 7 11 12 15 21 22 29 30 31 36 40 42 43 
48 49 50 56 58 61 64 67 70 72 76. 
2 0.8 4 8 9 13 16 19 20 25 26 32 35 37 41 46 47 51 
53 57 60 62 65 68 71 75 77. 
3 0.9 5 6 10 14 17 18 23 24 27 28 33 34 38 39 44 
45 52 54 55 59 63 66 69 73 74. 
BUS 5   
1 0.5 1 6 9 13 14 18 21 25 27 31 35 36 39 42. 
2 0.65 4 7 8 12 15 16 19 22 26 28 30 33 37 40. 





1 0.6 2 3 8 9 12 13 17 19 20 24 25 28 31 34 41 47. 
2 0.75 1 5 6 7 10 14 15 22 23 26 27 30 33 43 61. 
3 0.8 4 11 16 18 21 29 32 35 55. 
4 0.9 38 44. 
5 1.6 37 39 42 49 54 62. 
6 2.5 36 40 52 57 60. 
7 2.8 35 46 50 56 59 64. 
8 3.2 45 51 53 58 63. 
9 3.5 48. 
 TABLE 2.15 
COMPONENT RELIABILITY DATA FOR THE R.B.T.S 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
COMPONE










   
33/11  KV  0.015 -- 1.0 
LV 0.015 200 1.0 
BREAKERS     
33  KV  0.002 4.0 1.0 
11  KV  0.006 4.0 1.0 
BUS BARS     
33 KV 0.001 2.0 1.0 
11  KV  0.001 2.0 1.0 
LINES     
  33  
KV  











The Following comments relate to the design of distribution networks at buses 3,5and 6: 
 All feeders are operated as radial feeders but some are connected as a mesh through 
normally open sectionalizing points. Following an outage on feeder, the topology 
permits the sectionalizing points to be moved and customers to be supplied from 
alternative supply points. 
 The main and lateral sections of the radial feeders utilize overhead lines. 
 Disconnects, fuses, alternative supply and transformer repair are utilized for the 
reliability analysis of the radial feeders at all the buses. 
 The fuse gear and disconnects in the radial feeders are assumed to be 100% reliable. 
 The alternative supply and the distributed generator are assumed to be 100% available 
for all studies on the R.B.T.S i.e. the concept of expectation is not used in this research. 
 Large users at bus 3 are supplied from bulk power supply points, i.e., 138 Kv. 
The failure rates and repair durations of the various distribution components such as 
transformers, breakers, bus bars, and feeder sections follow the same data as presented in [29]. 
 
 
2.4.3. Distribution system reliability indices 
11  KV  0.065 5.0 1.0 
  
 
 Segment indices for segments at buses 2-6 are represented in Tables (2.16)-(2.20). On 
one hand segment indices include segment load point failure rate and segment load point 
repair time (Seg_LP_FR, Seg_LP_REP), i.e. the failure and repair rates of the load connected to this 
segment, segment annual down time (Seg_DTs) and relative costumer average interruption 
duration index (Rel_CAIDI). On the other hand, system indices include SAIDI and CAIDI; 
these indices provide a relative measure for a group of load points attached to a certain 
segment or for the entire distribution system. In these tables, the indices are evaluated for two 
cases one with DG and the other without DG (Base case) interconnected to the system 
showing how the reliability is improved by use of distributed resources as shown in the tables 
(2.16)-(2.20). Note that, indices for the feeders 6 and 7 of bus 3 and feeder 4 of bus 6 were not 
set because of data unavailability. 
 From the results obtained, it can be seen that there is a patent improvement in 
reliability indices viewing the contribution of distributed generators for the research purpose, 
this reliability enhancement can be remarked for both segment and system indices i.e. 
Seg_DTs, Rel_CAIDI, SAIDI, Sys_CAIDI. 
Concerning the first segment index (Seg_DTs), it is screened on the tables that the failure 
rates of all the segments do not change, that the indices of the two or three first segment closer 
to the original source do not change because load transfer cannot recover any load lost and to 
bring the system to the no violated state, and that the greatest effect occurs for the segments 
furthest from the original supply point and nearest to the DG interconnection point. 
 A propos the results related to the Relative_CAIDI index, it was defined as an indicator 
for reliability improvement need for a certain segment or load point, it is clear on the tables 
and for the total results, that it is always greater than 1 before and after the DG 
interconnection giving the information of no need of reliability improvement which means 
that all segments do not require a step up of reliability, which is not completely true, the 
justification is, the concept related to the present theory applied here (i.e. the reliability 
analysis sets was based on modeling the system in terms of segments and not in terms of 
components). So in this way, groups of component are processed without processing the 
intermediate components, but at least this index gives as a right significance, by having a 
relative sense with respect to the whole system and not to see if it is greater or less than one. It 
can be seen that, for the segments or load points farthest from the source have Relative_CAIDI 
less than those are closer to the source, also it is clear on the tables that using the DG 
  
 
intervention, this index is enhanced compared with the latest i.e. those segments closer to the 
source, and this is apparent by comparing the results before and after the DG intervention. 
 
TABLES 2.16 
Application To Roy Billinton Test System 
Bus 2/Feeder:1 Of The RBTS 
Without DG (Base case) 
Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
SW1 0.25625 1.4107 0.3615 34.202 3.677 12.364 
SW3 0.31025 11.463 3.5565 3.4765   
SW6 0.25625 14.002 3.588 3.446   
SW9 0.25625 2.2668 0.58088 21.285   
SW11 0.32325 11.882 3.8409 3.2191   
SW14 0.31025 12.17 3.7759 3.2745   
SW17 0.25625 3.1229 0.80025 15.45   
SW19 0.32325 12.561 4.0602 3.0452   
SW22 0.32 12.638 4.044 3.0574   
SW25 0.25625 3.8078 0.97575 12.671   
SW27 0.32325 13.104 4.2358 2.919   
Bus 2/Feeder:1 Of The RBTS 
With DG 
Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
SW1 0.25625 1.4107 0.3615 33.333 3.584 12.05 
SW3 0.31025 11.463 3.5565 3.3881   
SW6 0.25625 14.002 3.588 3.3584   
SW9 0.25625 1.3561 0.3475 34.676   
SW11 0.32325 11.16 3.6075 3.3402   
SW14 0.31025 11.418 3.5425 3.4015   
SW17 0.25625 1.3561 0.3475 34.676   
SW19 0.32325 11.16 3.6075 3.3402   
SW22 0.32 11.223 3.5912 3.3553   
SW25 0.25625 1.1849 0.30363 39.686   







Bus 2/Feeder:2 Of The RBTS 
Without DG (Base case) 
Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
SW1 0.09175 3.0436 0.27925 15.619 0.627 4.3617 
SW3 0.14375 3.7513 0.53925 8.0885   
SW5 0.09175 4.9564 0.45475 9.5915   
SW7 0.14375 4.9722 0.71475 6.1025   
Bus 2/Feeder:2 Of The RBTS 
With DG 
Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
SW1 0.09175 3.0436 0.27925 12.713 0.51 3.55 
SW3 0.14375 3.7513 0.53925 6.5832   
SW5 0.09175 2.4128 0.22138 16.036   
SW7 0.14375 3.3487 0.48138 7.3747   
Bus 2/Feeder:3 Of The RBTS 
Without DG (Base case) 
Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
SW1 0.1925 1.7123 0.32963 44.506 3.725 14.67 
SW3 0.2465 14.299 3.5246 4.1622   
SW6 0.1925 2.9279 0.56363 26.028   
SW8 0.25625 14.858 3.8074 3.8531   
SW11 0.2595 14.735 3.8236 3.8367   
SW14 0.1925 3.8396 0.73913 19.848   
SW16 0.25625 15.543 3.9829 3.6833   
SW19 0.2595 15.411 3.9991 3.6684   
SW22 0.1925 4.9792 0.9585 15.305   










Bus 2/Feeder:3 Of The RBTS 
With DG 
Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
SW1 0.1925 1.7123 0.32963 42.558 3.562 14.028 
SW3 0.2465 14.299 3.5246 3.98   
SW6 0.1925 1.7156 0.33025 42.477   
SW8 0.25625 13.947 3.574 3.925   
SW11 0.2595 13.835 3.5903 3.9073   
SW14 0.1925 1.4117 0.27175 51.621   
SW16 0.25625 13.719 3.5155 3.9903   
SW19 0.2595 13.61 3.5318 3.972   
SW22 0.1925 1.6396 0.31563 44.445   
SW24 0.2465 14.242 3.5106 3.9959   
Bus 2/Feeder:4 Of The RBTS 
Without DG (Base case) 
Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
SW1 0.1925 1.7883 0.34425 42.978 3.715 14.795 
SW3 0.25625 14.002 3.588 4.1235   
SW6 0.2465 14.358 3.5393 4.1803   
SW9 0.1925 2.9279 0.56363 26.25   
SW11 0.2465 15.248 3.7586 3.9363   
SW14 0.2595 14.735 3.8236 3.8694   
SW17 0.1925 4.0675 0.783 18.895   
SW19 0.2595 15.58 4.043 3.6595   
SW22 0.1925 4.9792 0.9585 15.436   
SW24 0.25625 16.399 4.2023 3.5208   









Bus 2/Feeder:4 Of The RBTS 
With DG 
Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
SW1 0.1925 1.7883 0.34425 40.984 3.542 14.109 
SW3 0.25625 14.002 3.588 3.9322   
SW6 0.2465 14.358 3.5393 3.9863   
SW9 0.1925 1.6396 0.31563 44.701   
SW11 0.2465 14.242 3.5106 4.0188   
SW14 0.2595 13.779 3.5756 3.9458   
SW17 0.1925 1.6396 0.31563 44.701   
SW19 0.2595 13.779 3.5756 3.9458   
SW22 0.1925 1.4117 0.27175 51.918   
SW24 0.25625 13.719 3.5155 4.0133   




















 TABLES 2.17 
  
 
 Application To Roy Billinton Test System 
 Bus 3/Feeder:1 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.251 1.255 0.315 41.796 4.091 13.166 
 SW3 0.251 1.255 0.315 41.796   
LP1 SW4 0.305 11.508 3.51 3.7509   
 SW7 0.251 2.3038 0.57825 22.768   
 SW9 0.251 2.3038 0.57825 22.768   
LP2 SW10 0.318 12.07 3.8383 3.4301   
 SW13 0.251 3.2361 0.81225 16.209   
 SW15 0.251 3.2361 0.81225 16.209   
LP3 SW16 0.305 13.139 4.0073 3.2855   
 SW19 0.251 4.2849 1.0755 12.241   
 SW21 0.251 4.2849 1.0755 12.241   
LP4 SW22 0.3245 13.461 4.368 3.0141   
LP5 SW25 0.318 13.634 4.3355 3.0367   
 SW28 0.251 4.9841 1.251 10.524   
 SW30 0.251 4.9841 1.251 10.524   
LP6 SW31 0.305 14.577 4.446 2.9612   
LP7 SW34 0.305 14.577 4.446 2.9612   
 Bus 3/Feeder:1 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.251 1.255 0.315 34.218 3.349 10.779 
 SW3 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.885   
LP1 SW4 0.305 10.887 3.3205 3.2461   
 SW7 0.251 1.5488 0.38875 27.726   
 SW9 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.885   
LP2 SW10 0.318 10.646 3.3855 3.1837   
 SW13 0.251 1.4323 0.3595 29.982   
 SW15 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.885   
LP3 SW16 0.305 10.887 3.3205 3.2461   
 SW19 0.251 1.5488 0.38875 27.726   
 SW21 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.885   
LP4 SW22 0.3245 10.533 3.418 3.1535   
LP5 SW25 0.318 10.646 3.3855 3.1837   
 SW28 0.251 1.1992 0.301 35.809   
 SW30 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.885   
LP6 SW31 0.305 10.887 3.3205 3.2461   








Bus 3/Feeder:2 Of The RBTS 
  
 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.173 2.1026 0.36375 10.569 0.857 3.8444 
 SW3 0.173 2.1026 0.36375 10.569   
LP8 SW4 0.2315 2.8348 0.65625 5.8582   
 SW6 0.173 3.4552 0.59775 6.4315   
 SW8 0.173 3.4552 0.59775 6.4315   
LP9 SW9 0.212 3.7394 0.79275 4.8495   
 SW11 0.173 4.9769 0.861 4.4651   
 SW13 0.173 4.9769 0.861 4.4651   
LP10 SW14 0.225 4.9822 1.121 3.4295   
 Bus 3/Feeder:2 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.173 2.1026 0.36375 4.1412 0.336 1.5064 
 SW3 0.173 0.5 0.0865 17.415   
LP8 SW4 0.2315 1.6371 0.379 3.9746   
 SW6 0.173 1.8526 0.3205 4.7   
 SW8 0.173 0.5 0.0865 17.415   
LP9 SW9 0.212 1.3278 0.2815 5.3512   
 SW11 0.173 2.0217 0.34975 4.307   
 SW13 0.173 0.5 0.0865 17.415   
LP10 SW14 0.225 1.54 0.3465 4.3474   
 Bus 3/Feeder:3 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.251 1.255 0.315 43.704 4.331 13.767 
 SW3 0.251 1.255 0.315 43.704   
LP11 SW4 0.305 11.508 3.51 3.9222   
 SW7 0.251 2.3038 0.57825 23.808   
 SW9 0.251 2.3038 0.57825 23.808   
LP12 SW10 0.3245 11.928 3.8708 3.5566   
 SW13 0.251 3.2361 0.81225 16.949   
 SW15 0.251 3.2361 0.81225 16.949   
LP13 SW16 0.318 12.806 4.0723 3.3807   
LP14 SW19 0.3245 12.649 4.1048 3.3539   
 SW22 0.251 4.2849 1.0755 12.8   
 SW24 0.251 4.2849 1.0755 12.8   
LP15 SW25 0.305 14.002 4.2705 3.2237   
 SW28 0.251 4.9841 1.251 11.005   
 SW30 0.251 4.9841 1.251 11.005   
LP16 SW31 0.318 14.186 4.511 3.0518   







 Bus 3/Feeder:3 Of The RBTS 
  
 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.251 1.255 0.315 33.99 3.369 10.707 
 SW3 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.314   
LP11 SW4 0.305 10.887 3.3205 3.2245   
 SW7 0.251 1.5488 0.38875 27.542   
 SW9 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.314   
LP12 SW10 0.3245 10.533 3.418 3.1325   
 SW13 0.251 1.4323 0.3595 29.783   
 SW15 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.314   
LP13 SW16 0.318 10.646 3.3855 3.1626   
LP14 SW19 0.3245 10.533 3.418 3.1325   
 SW22 0.251 1.5488 0.38875 27.542   
 SW24 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.314   
LP15 SW25 0.305 10.887 3.3205 3.2245   
 SW28 0.251 1.1992 0.301 35.571   
 SW30 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.314   
LP16 SW31 0.318 10.646 3.3855 3.1626   
LP17 SW34 0.318 10.646 3.3855 3.1626   
 Bus 3/Feeder:4 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.251 1.255 0.315 40.255 4.007 12.68 
 SW3 0.251 1.255 0.315 40.255   
LP18 SW4 0.318 11.242 3.575 3.5469   
 SW7 0.251 1.9542 0.4905 25.852   
 SW9 0.251 1.9542 0.4905 25.852   
LP19 SW10 0.3245 11.658 3.783 3.3519   
 SW13 0.251 3.003 0.75375 16.823   
 SW15 0.251 3.003 0.75375 16.823   
LP20 SW16 0.318 12.622 4.0137 3.1592   
LP21 SW19 0.305 12.947 3.9488 3.2112   
 SW22 0.251 3.9353 0.98775 12.838   
 SW24 0.251 3.9353 0.98775 12.838   
LP22 SW25 0.3245 13.19 4.2803 2.9625   
 SW28 0.251 4.9841 1.251 10.136   
 SW30 0.251 4.9841 1.251 10.136   
LP23 SW31 0.318 14.186 4.511 2.811   
LP24 SW34 0.305 14.577 4.446 2.8521   
        
 Bus 3/Feeder:4 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.251 1.255 0.315 33.911 3.376 10.682 
 SW3 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.115   
LP18 SW4 0.318 10.646 3.3855 3.1552   
 SW7 0.251 1.1992 0.301 35.488   
 SW9 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.115   
LP19 SW10 0.3245 10.533 3.418 3.1252   
 SW13 0.251 1.5488 0.38875 27.478   
 SW15 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.115   
  
 
LP20 SW16 0.318 10.646 3.3855 3.1552   
LP21 SW19 0.305 10.887 3.3205 3.217   
 SW22 0.251 1.4323 0.3595 29.713   
 SW24 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.115   
LP22 SW25 0.3245 10.533 3.418 3.1252   
 SW28 0.251 1.5488 0.38875 27.478   
 SW30 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.115   
LP23 SW31 0.318 10.646 3.3855 3.1552   
LP24 SW34 0.305 10.887 3.3205 3.217   
 Bus 3/Feeder:5 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.2575 1.5767 0.406 33.049 4.314 13.418 
 SW3 0.2575 1.5767 0.406 33.049   
LP25 SW4 0.3245 11.297 3.666 3.6601   
 SW7 0.2575 2.599 0.66925 20.049   
 SW9 0.2575 2.599 0.66925 20.049   
LP26 SW10 0.3245 12.109 3.9293 3.4149   
 SW13 0.2575 3.2806 0.84475 15.884   
 SW15 0.2575 3.2806 0.84475 15.884   
LP27 SW16 0.3115 12.969 4.0397 3.3215   
 SW19 0.2575 3.9621 1.0203 13.152   
 SW21 0.2575 3.9621 1.0203 13.152   
LP28 SW22 0.3245 13.19 4.2803 3.1348   
LP29 SW25 0.3245 13.19 4.2803 3.1348   
 SW28 0.2575 4.9845 1.2835 10.454   
 SW30 0.2575 4.9845 1.2835 10.454   
LP30 SW31 0.331 13.825 4.576 2.9322   
LP31 SW34 0.3115 14.377 4.4785 2.9961   
 Bus 3/Feeder:5 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.2575 1.5767 0.406 25.846 3.374 10.493 
 SW3 0.2575 0.5 0.12875 81.501   
LP25 SW4 0.3245 10.443 3.3888 3.0965   
 SW7 0.2575 1.5223 0.392 26.769   
 SW9 0.2575 0.5 0.12875 81.501   
LP26 SW10 0.3245 10.443 3.3888 3.0965   
 SW13 0.2575 1.1816 0.30425 34.489   
 SW15 0.2575 0.5 0.12875 81.501   
LP27 SW16 0.3115 10.67 3.3238 3.1571   
 SW19 0.2575 1.1816 0.30425 34.489   
 SW21 0.2575 0.5 0.12875 81.501   
LP28 SW22 0.3245 10.443 3.3888 3.0965   
LP29 SW25 0.3245 10.443 3.3888 3.0965   
 SW28 0.2575 1.5223 0.392 26.769   
 SW30 0.2575 0.5 0.12875 81.501   
LP30 SW31 0.331 10.336 3.4213 3.0671   
LP31 SW34 0.3115 10.67 3.3238 3.1571   
  
Bus 3/Feeder:6 Of The RBTS 
  
 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.2185 1.635 0.35725 40.715 4.059 14.545 
 SW3 0.2185 1.635 0.35725 40.715   
LP32 SW4 0.2725 13.036 3.5522 4.0947   
LP33 SW7 0.292 12.499 3.6498 3.9853   
 SW10 0.2185 2.7059 0.59125 24.601   
 SW12 0.2185 2.7059 0.59125 24.601   
LP34 SW13 0.2725 13.894 3.7862 3.8417   
LP35 SW16 0.2855 13.489 3.8513 3.7768   
 SW19 0.2185 3.9108 0.8545 17.022   
 SW21 0.2185 3.9108 0.8545 17.022   
LP36 SW22 0.2725 14.861 4.0495 3.5919   
 SW25 0.2185 4.9817 1.0885 13.363   
 SW27 0.2185 4.9817 1.0885 13.363   
LP37 SW28 0.2725 15.719 4.2835 3.3957   
LP38 SW31 0.292 15.003 4.381 3.3201   
  Bus 3/Feeder:6 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1 0.2185 1.635 0.35725 33.472 3.337 11.958 
 SW3 0.2185 0.5 0.10925 109.45   
LP32 SW4 0.2725 12.126 3.3042 3.6189   
LP33 SW7 0.292 11.65 3.4017 3.5152   
 SW10 0.2185 1.5709 0.34325 34.837   
 SW12 0.2185 0.5 0.10925 109.45   
LP34 SW13 0.2725 12.126 3.3042 3.6189   
LP35 SW16 0.2855 11.801 3.3693 3.5491   
 SW19 0.2185 1.7048 0.3725 32.101   
 SW21 0.2185 0.5 0.10925 109.45   
LP36 SW22 0.2725 12.126 3.3042 3.6189   
 SW25 0.2185 1.5709 0.34325 34.837   
 SW27 0.2185 0.5 0.10925 109.45   
LP37 SW28 0.2725 12.126 3.3042 3.6189   










 TABLES 2.18 
 Application To Roy Billinton Test System 
  Bus 4/Feeder:1 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.2445 1.4545 0.35563 36.891 4.0018 13.119 
 SW3  0.2445 1.4545 0.35563 36.891   
LP1 SW4  0.2985 11.895 3.5506 3.695   
 SW7  0.2445 2.4116 0.58963 22.25   
 SW9  0.2445 2.4116 0.58963 22.25   
LP2 SW10 0.30825 12.436 3.8334 3.4224   
 SW13 0.2445 3.3686 0.82363 15.929   
 SW15 0.2445 3.3686 0.82363 15.929   
LP3 SW16 0.2985 13.463 4.0186 3.2647   
 SW19 0.2445 4.2658 1.043 12.579   
 SW21 0.2445 4.2658 1.043 12.579   
LP4 SW22 0.3115 13.814 4.303 3.0489   
LP5 SW25 0.30825 13.907 4.2867 3.0605   
 SW28 0.2445 4.9836 1.2185 10.767   
 SW30 0.2445 4.9836 1.2185 10.767   
LP6 SW31 0.3115 14.377 4.4785 2.9294   
LP7 SW34 0.30825 14.476 4.4623 2.9401   
  Bus 4/Feeder:1 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.2445 1.4545 0.35563 30.881 3.3499 10.982 
 SW3  0.2445 0.5 0.12225 89.834   
LP1 SW4  0.2985 11.113 3.3173 3.3106   
 SW7  0.2445 1.4571 0.35625 30.827   
 SW9  0.2445 0.5 0.12225 89.834   
LP2 SW10 0.30825 10.92 3.366 3.2627   
 SW13 0.2445 1.4571 0.35625 30.827   
 SW15 0.2445 0.5 0.12225 89.834   
LP3 SW16 0.2985 11.113 3.3173 3.3106   
 SW19 0.2445 1.3972 0.34163 32.147   
 SW21 0.2445 0.5 0.12225 89.834   
LP4 SW22 0.3115 10.858 3.3823 3.247   
LP5 SW25 0.30825 10.92 3.366 3.2627   
 SW28 0.2445 1.2178 0.29775 36.884   
 SW30 0.2445 0.5 0.12225 89.834   
LP6 SW31 0.3115 10.858 3.3823 3.247   













  Bus 4/Feeder:2 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.147 2.1871 0.3215 12.355 0.76892 3.972 
 SW3  0.147 2.1871 0.3215 12.355   
LP8 SW4  0.186 2.7769 0.5165 7.6903   
 SW6  0.147 3.7789 0.5555 7.1503   
 SW8  0.147 3.7789 0.5555 7.1503   
LP9 SW9  0.19575 4.083 0.79925 4.9697   
 SW11 0.147 4.9728 0.731 5.4337   
 SW13 0.147 4.9728 0.731 5.4337   
LP10 SW14 0.199 4.9799 0.991 4.0081   
  Bus 4/Feeder:2 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.147 2.1871 0.3215 4.9234 0.30642 1.5829 
 SW3  0.147 0.5 0.0735 21.536   
LP8 SW4  0.186 1.4435 0.2685 5.8952   
 SW6  0.147 2.0918 0.3075 5.1475   
 SW8  0.147 0.5 0.0735 21.536   
LP9 SW9  0.19575 1.6207 0.31725 4.9893   
 SW11 0.147 1.6939 0.249 6.3569   
 SW13 0.147 0.5 0.0735 21.536   
LP10 SW14 0.199 1.6759 0.3335 4.7462   
  Bus 4/Feeder:3 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.23475 1.4941 0.35075 37.574 3.9177 13.179 
 SW3  0.23475 1.4941 0.35075 37.574   
LP11 SW4  0.30175 11.966 3.6108 3.6499   
 SW7  0.23475 2.2417 0.52625 25.043   
 SW9  0.23475 2.2417 0.52625 25.043   
LP12 SW10 0.2985 12.63 3.77 3.4957   
 SW13 0.23475 3.2386 0.76025 17.335   
 SW15 0.23475 3.2386 0.76025 17.335   
LP13 SW16 0.2985 13.414 4.004 3.2915   
LP14 SW19 0.28875 13.698 3.9552 3.332   
 SW22 0.23475 4.2354 0.99425 13.255   
 SW24 0.23475 4.2354 0.99425 13.255   
LP15 SW25 0.2985 14.198 4.238 3.1097   
 SW28 0.23475 4.983 1.1698 11.266   
 SW30 0.23475 4.983 1.1698 11.266   
LP16 SW31 0.2985 14.786 4.4135 2.9861   









  Bus 4/Feeder:3 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.23475 1.4941 0.35075 32.177 3.355 11.286 
 SW3  0.23475 0.5 0.11737 96.154   
LP11 SW4  0.30175 11.193 3.3774 3.3417   
 SW7  0.23475 1.2476 0.29288 38.535   
 SW9  0.23475 0.5 0.11737 96.154   
LP12 SW10 0.2985 11.26 3.3611 3.3578   
 SW13 0.23475 1.4968 0.35137 32.12   
 SW15 0.23475 0.5 0.11737 96.154   
LP13 SW16 0.2985 11.26 3.3611 3.3578   
LP14 SW19 0.28875 11.471 3.3124 3.4072   
 SW22 0.23475 1.4968 0.35137 32.12   
 SW24 0.23475 0.5 0.11737 96.154   
LP15 SW25 0.2985 11.26 3.3611 3.3578   
 SW28 0.23475 1.2476 0.29288 38.535   
 SW30 0.23475 0.5 0.11737 96.154   
LP16 SW31 0.2985 11.26 3.3611 3.3578   
LP17 SW34 0.28875 11.471 3.3124 3.4072   
  Bus 4/Feeder:4 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.251 1.488 0.3735 33.974 3.953 12.689 
 SW3  0.251 1.488 0.3735 33.974   
LP18 SW4  0.31475 11.492 3.6173 3.508   
 SW7  0.251 2.4203 0.6075 20.888   
 SW9  0.251 2.4203 0.6075 20.888   
LP19 SW10 0.305 12.467 3.8025 3.3371   
LP20 SW13 0.31475 12.236 3.8512 3.2948   
 SW16 0.251 3.3526 0.8415 15.079   
 SW18 0.251 3.3526 0.8415 15.079   
LP21 SW19 0.31475 12.979 4.0852 3.1061   
LP22 SW22 0.305 13.234 4.0365 3.1436   
 SW25 0.251 4.2849 1.0755 11.798   
 SW27 0.251 4.2849 1.0755 11.798   
LP23 SW28 0.31475 13.723 4.3192 2.9378   
 SW31 0.251 4.9841 1.251 10.143   
 SW33 0.251 4.9841 1.251 10.143   
LP24 SW34 0.31475 14.28 4.4947 2.8231   














  Bus 4/Feeder:4 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.251 1.488 0.3735 28.818 3.3531 10.764 
 SW3  0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.766   
LP18 SW4  0.31475 10.705 3.3693 3.1947   
 SW7  0.251 1.4323 0.3595 29.94   
 SW9  0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.766   
LP19 SW10 0.305 10.887 3.3205 3.2416   
LP20 SW13 0.31475 10.705 3.3693 3.1947   
 SW16 0.251 1.4323 0.3595 29.94   
 SW18 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.766   
LP21 SW19 0.31475 10.705 3.3693 3.1947   
LP22 SW22 0.305 10.887 3.3205 3.2416   
 SW25 0.251 1.4323 0.3595 29.94   
 SW27 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.766   
LP23 SW28 0.31475 10.705 3.3693 3.1947   
 SW31 0.251 1.1992 0.301 35.759   
 SW33 0.251 0.5 0.1255 85.766   
LP24 SW34 0.31475 10.705 3.3693 3.1947   
LP25 SW37 0.305 10.887 3.3205 3.2416   
  Bus 4/Feeder:5 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
 Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.14375 2.2252 0.31988 12.202 0.74292 3.9032 
LP26 SW3  0.14375 2.2252 0.31988 12.202   
 SW4  0.1925 2.9279 0.56363 6.9252   
 SW6  0.14375 3.4461 0.49538 7.8794   
LP27 SW8  0.14375 3.4461 0.49538 7.8794   
 SW9  0.19575 3.8589 0.75538 5.1673   
 SW11 0.14375 4.9722 0.71475 5.461   
LP28 SW13 0.14375 4.9722 0.71475 5.461   
 SW14 0.18275 4.9781 0.90975 4.2905   
  Bus 4/Feeder:5 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
 Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.14375 2.2252 0.31988 5.0062 0.30479 1.6014 
LP26 SW3  0.14375 0.5 0.071875 22.28   
 SW4  0.1925 1.6396 0.31563 5.0736   
 SW6  0.14375 1.7209 0.24738 6.4734   
LP27 SW8  0.14375 0.5 0.071875 22.28   
 SW9  0.19575 1.6954 0.33188 4.8252   
 SW11 0.14375 2.0261 0.29125 5.4982   
LP28 SW13 0.14375 0.5 0.071875 22.28   









  Bus 4/Feeder:6 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.15675 1.9888 0.31175 12.202 0.757 3.804 
 SW3  0.15675 1.9888 0.31175 12.202   
LP29 SW4  0.19575 2.5888 0.50675 7.5067   
 SW6  0.15675 3.4817 0.54575 6.9703   
 SW8  0.15675 3.4817 0.54575 6.9703   
LP30 SW9  0.2055 3.8418 0.7895 4.8183   
 SW11 0.15675 4.9745 0.77975 4.8785   
 SW13 0.15675 4.9745 0.77975 4.8785   
LP31 SW14 0.19575 4.9796 0.97475 3.9026   
  Bus 4/Feeder:6 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.15675 1.9888 0.31175 4.6685 0.28963 1.4554 
 SW3  0.15675 0.5 0.078375 18.57   
LP29 SW4  0.19575 1.3966 0.27338 5.3238   
 SW6  0.15675 1.9928 0.31238 4.6592   
 SW8  0.15675 0.5 0.078375 18.57   
LP30 SW9  0.2055 1.5675 0.32212 4.5181   
 SW11 0.15675 1.9928 0.31238 4.6592   
 SW13 0.15675 0.5 0.078375 18.57   
LP31 SW14 0.19575 1.3966 0.27338 5.3238   
  Bus 4/Feeder:7 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.238 1.4806 0.35238 37.625 3.9863 13.258 
 SW3  0.238 1.4806 0.35238 37.625   
LP32 SW4  0.305 11.844 3.6124 3.6702   
 SW7  0.238 2.218 0.52788 25.116   
 SW9  0.238 2.218 0.52788 25.116   
LP33 SW10 0.305 12.419 3.7879 3.5001   
 SW13 0.238 3.1397 0.74725 17.742   
 SW15 0.238 3.1397 0.74725 17.742   
LP34 SW16 0.292 13.501 3.9423 3.3631   
LP35 SW19 0.305 13.139 4.0073 3.3085   
 SW22 0.238 4.0614 0.96663 13.716   
 SW24 0.238 4.0614 0.96663 13.716   
LP36 SW25 0.292 14.252 4.1616 3.1858   
 SW28 0.238 4.9832 1.186 11.179   
 SW30 0.238 4.9832 1.186 11.179   
LP37 SW31 0.305 14.577 4.446 2.982   










  Bus 4/Feeder:7 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.238 1.4806 0.35238 31.689 3.3573 11.166 
 SW3  0.238 0.5 0.119 93.834   
LP32 SW4  0.305 11.079 3.379 3.3046   
 SW7  0.238 1.2374 0.2945 37.916   
 SW9  0.238 0.5 0.119 93.834   
LP33 SW10 0.305 11.079 3.379 3.3046   
 SW13 0.238 1.4217 0.33838 33   
 SW15 0.238 0.5 0.119 93.834   
LP34 SW16 0.292 11.349 3.314 3.3694   
LP35 SW19 0.305 11.079 3.379 3.3046   
 SW22 0.238 1.4217 0.33838 33   
 SW24 0.238 0.5 0.119 93.834   
LP36 SW25 0.292 11.349 3.314 3.3694   
 SW28 0.238 1.4217 0.33838 33   
 SW30 0.238 0.5 0.119 93.834   
LP37 SW31 0.305 11.079 3.379 3.3046   

















 TABLES 2.19 
 Application To Roy Billinton Test System 
  Bus 5/Feeder:1 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.173 1.4263 0.24675 63.769 3.6156 15.735 
LP1 SW3  0.24 14.611 3.5068 4.487   
LP2 SW6  0.24 14.611 3.5068 4.487   
 SW9  0.173 2.5253 0.43688 36.017   
LP3 SW11 0.24 15.404 3.6969 4.2563   
LP4 SW14 0.2205 16.324 3.5994 4.3716   
 SW17 0.173 3.6243 0.627 25.096   
LP5 SW19 0.23025 16.67 3.8382 4.0995   
LP6 SW22 0.2205 17.186 3.7895 4.1522   
 SW25 0.173 4.9769 0.861 18.275   
LP7 SW27 0.24 17.171 4.121 3.8182   
  Bus 5/Feeder:1 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.173 1.4263 0.24675 61.246 3.4726 15.112 
LP1 SW3  0.24 14.611 3.5068 4.3095   
LP2 SW6  0.24 14.611 3.5068 4.3095   
 SW9  0.173 1.599 0.27663 54.632   
LP3 SW11 0.24 14.736 3.5366 4.2731   
LP4 SW14 0.2205 15.597 3.4391 4.3943   
 SW17 0.173 1.599 0.27663 54.632   
LP5 SW19 0.23025 15.148 3.4879 4.3329   
LP6 SW22 0.2205 15.597 3.4391 4.3943   
 SW25 0.173 1.8526 0.3205 47.153   
LP7 SW27 0.24 14.919 3.5805 4.2208   
  Bus 5/Feeder:2 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.2055 1.4933 0.30688 43.078 3.5053 13.22 
LP8 SW3  0.253 13.713 3.4694 3.8104   
 SW6  0.2055 1.2117 0.249 53.091   
LP9 SW8  0.26275 13.169 3.4603 3.8204   
 SW11 0.2055 1.4252 0.29288 45.138   
LP10 SW13 0.2725 13.038 3.5529 3.7208   
 SW16 0.2055 1.2117 0.249 53.091   
LP11 SW18 0.26275 13.169 3.4603 3.8204   
 SW21 0.2055 1.6387 0.33675 39.257   
LP12 SW23 0.253 13.831 3.4993 3.7779   









  Bus 5/Feeder:2 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.2055 1.4933 0.30688 43.078 3.5053 13.22 
LP8 SW3  0.253 13.713 3.4694 3.8104   
 SW6  0.2055 1.2117 0.249 53.091   
LP9 SW8  0.26275 13.169 3.4603 3.8204   
 SW11 0.2055 1.4252 0.29288 45.138   
LP10 SW13 0.2725 13.038 3.5529 3.7208   
 SW16 0.2055 1.2117 0.249 53.091   
LP11 SW18 0.26275 13.169 3.4603 3.8204   
 SW21 0.2055 1.6387 0.33675 39.257   
LP12 SW23 0.253 13.831 3.4993 3.7779   
LP13 SW26 0.26275 13.503 3.548 3.726   
  Bus 5/Feeder:3 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.173 1.9335 0.3345 48.125 3.7071 16.098 
LP14 SW3  0.24 14.977 3.5945 4.4785   
 SW6  0.173 2.7789 0.48075 33.485   
LP15 SW8  0.23025 16.035 3.692 4.3602   
LP16 SW11 0.2205 16.523 3.6433 4.4186   
 SW14 0.173 3.8779 0.67088 23.995   
LP17 SW16 0.24 16.379 3.9309 4.0953   
 SW19 0.173 4.9769 0.861 18.697   
LP18 SW21 0.2205 18.247 4.0235 4.001   
LP19 SW24 0.24 17.171 4.121 3.9063   
  Bus 5/Feeder:3 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.173 1.9335 0.3345 44.82 3.4525 14.992 
LP14 SW3  0.24 14.977 3.5945 4.1709   
 SW6  0.173 1.3454 0.23275 64.414   
LP15 SW8  0.23025 14.958 3.444 4.3532   
LP16 SW11 0.2205 15.398 3.3953 4.4157   
 SW14 0.173 1.599 0.27663 54.197   
LP17 SW16 0.24 14.736 3.5366 4.2391   
 SW19 0.173 1.599 0.27663 54.197   
LP18 SW21 0.2205 15.597 3.4391 4.3593   
















  Bus 5/Feeder:4 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.16325 1.7504 0.28575 59.817 3.7607 17.093 
LP20 SW3  0.23025 15.4 3.5458 4.8206   
LP21 SW6  0.21075 16.362 3.4483 4.9569   
 SW9  0.16325 2.6462 0.432 39.566   
LP22 SW11 0.2205 16.523 3.6433 4.6916   
LP23 SW14 0.23025 16.035 3.692 4.6297   
 SW17 0.16325 3.5421 0.57825 29.559   
LP24 SW19 0.2205 17.186 3.7895 4.5105   
 SW22 0.16325 4.9755 0.81225 21.044   
LP25 SW24 0.21075 18.86 3.9748 4.3003   
LP26 SW27 0.23025 17.686 4.0723 4.1974   
  Bus 5/Feeder:4 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.16325 1.7504 0.28575 55.786 3.5072 15.941 
LP20 SW3  0.23025 15.4 3.5458 4.4957   
LP21 SW6  0.21075 16.362 3.4483 4.6229   
 SW9  0.16325 1.3959 0.22787 69.954   
LP22 SW11 0.2205 15.597 3.4391 4.6351   
LP23 SW14 0.23025 15.148 3.4879 4.5703   
 SW17 0.16325 1.3959 0.22787 69.954   
LP24 SW19 0.2205 15.597 3.4391 4.6351   
 SW22 0.16325 1.9334 0.31562 50.505   
LP25 SW24 0.21075 16.504 3.4781 4.5832   













 TABLES 2.20 
 Application To Roy Billinton Test System 
  Bus 6/Feeder:1 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.28025 1.3327 0.3735 32.139 4.0772 12.004 
LP1 SW3  0.33425 10.676 3.5685 3.3638   
 SW6  0.28025 1.959 0.549 21.865   
LP2 SW8  0.34725 10.969 3.809 3.1514   
 SW11 0.28025 2.7417 0.76838 15.622   
LP3 SW13 0.344 11.663 4.0121 2.9919   
 SW16 0.28025 3.5245 0.98775 12.153   
LP4 SW18 0.33425 12.514 4.1827 2.8698   
 SW21 0.28025 4.1508 1.1633 10.319   
LP5 SW23 0.344 12.811 4.407 2.7238   
 SW26 0.28025 4.9857 1.3973 8.591   
LP6 SW28 0.33425 13.739 4.5922 2.6139   
  Bus 6/Feeder:1 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.28025 1.3327 0.3735 28.159 3.5723 10.517 
LP1 SW3  0.33425 10.676 3.5685 2.9473   
 SW6  0.28025 1.1262 0.31562 33.322   
LP2 SW8  0.34725 10.297 3.5756 2.9414   
 SW11 0.28025 1.2828 0.3595 29.255   
LP3 SW13 0.344 10.475 3.6032 2.9188   
 SW16 0.28025 1.2828 0.3595 29.255   
LP4 SW18 0.33425 10.634 3.5545 2.9589   
 SW21 0.28025 1.1262 0.31563 33.322   
LP5 SW23 0.344 10.347 3.5594 2.9548   
 SW26 0.28025 1.335 0.37413 28.112   
LP6 SW28 0.33425 10.678 3.5691 2.9468   
  Bus 6/Feeder:2 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.3095 1.1123 0.34425 32.554 4.1622 11.207 
LP7 SW3  0.37325 9.6129 3.588 3.1234   
 SW6  0.3095 1.8211 0.56363 19.883   
LP8 SW8  0.3765 10.156 3.8236 2.9309   
 SW11 0.3095 2.3881 0.73913 15.162   
LP9 SW13 0.3765 10.622 3.9991 2.8023   
 SW16 0.3095 2.9552 0.91463 12.253   
LP10 SW18 0.3635 11.306 4.1096 2.727   
 SW21 0.3095 3.7112 1.1486 9.7567   
LP11 SW23 0.37325 11.768 4.3924 2.5514   
 SW26 0.3095 4.42 1.368 8.1921   
LP12 SW28 0.3635 12.553 4.563 2.456   
 SW31 0.3095 4.9871 1.5435 7.2607   





 Bus 6/Feeder:2 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.3095 1.1123 0.34425 28.056 3.5871 9.6584 
LP7 SW3  0.37325 9.6129 3.588 2.6919   
 SW6  0.3095 1.2088 0.37413 25.816   
LP8 SW8  0.3765 9.6524 3.6341 2.6577   
 SW11 0.3095 1.067 0.33025 29.246   
LP9 SW13 0.3765 9.5359 3.5903 2.6902   
 SW16 0.3095 1.067 0.33025 29.246   
LP10 SW18 0.3635 9.6981 3.5252 2.7398   
 SW21 0.3095 1.2561 0.38875 24.845   
LP11 SW23 0.37325 9.7321 3.6325 2.6589   
 SW26 0.3095 1.2088 0.37413 25.816   
LP12 SW28 0.3635 9.8188 3.5691 2.7061   
 SW31 0.3095 1.067 0.33025 29.246   
LP13 SW33 0.37325 9.5754 3.574 2.7024   
  Bus 6/Feeder:3 Of The RBTS 
 Without DG (Base case) 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.1925 1.7123 0.32963 44.023 3.5722 14.511 
LP14 SW3  0.2465 14.299 3.5246 4.117   
 SW6  0.1925 2.9279 0.56363 25.746   
LP15 SW8  0.24125 3.3466 0.80738 17.973   
 SW10 0.1925 3.8396 0.73913 19.633   
LP16 SW12 0.2445 4.0864 0.99913 14.524   
 SW14 0.1925 4.9792 0.9585 15.139   
LP17 SW16 0.2465 16.85 4.1535 3.4937   
  Bus 6/Feeder:3 Of The RBTS 
 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs Rel_CAIDI SAIDI Sys_CAIDI 
 SW1  0.1925 1.7123 0.32963 40.029 3.2481 13.195 
LP14 SW3  0.2465 14.299 3.5246 3.7435   
 SW6  0.1925 1.7156 0.33025 39.953   
LP15 SW8  0.24125 2.3793 0.574 22.987   
 SW10 0.1925 1.4117 0.27175 48.554   
LP16 SW12 0.2445 2.1748 0.53175 24.813   
 SW14 0.1925 1.6396 0.31563 41.804   








 This chapter here presents the application of the entire theories and techniques 
described and discussed in the previous chapter. The test system of Roy Billinton (R.B.T.S) 
used throughout this thesis is described in this chapter. The test system used throughout this 
thesis to illustrate the basic concepts and procedures involved in the overall power system 
reliability analysis. The concepts outlined in chapter 1 are utilized in this chapter to predict 
the reliability indices for overall power system. 
The reliability indices for the Roy Billinton test system (R.B.T.S) are found calculated. 
The results for the HLII level are screened out on tables 2.3-7. The distribution system 
reliability indices for the distribution system are screened out on tables 2.16-20. These results 
calculated in this chapter are utilized for the overall power system reliability assessment in 
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This section is devoted to the development of a data generator for calculating (mainly) 
the reliability, load flow, the static and dynamic stability of electrical grid network; and other 
  
 
constraints that may affect it, namely, short-circuit and lightning. Draw up of this generator is 
based on the theory of programming called "oriented objects" which is a software program 
using a definite bottom-up design like "messages" exchanged by called basic entities objects; 
this theory, which makes the behavior of an object, describes how this one changes state with 
the reception of messages of other objects and how it transmits itself the messages to the other 
objects. 
After having traced the necessary diagram, this data generator permits to obtain 
automatically all information on each object (bus, lines, transformers, etc) necessary for 
calculating and analyzing different events happening in a grid network; this “graphical” 
information is collected in the forms of matrix. The studied case, in this section, has twenty 
seven information on each object. 
  Object-oriented programming (OOP) is a programming paradigm that uses "objects" 
– data structures consisting of data fields and methods together with their interactions – to 
design applications and computer programs. Programming techniques may include features 
such as information hiding, data abstraction, encapsulation, modularity, polymorphism, and 
inheritance. 
The object-oriented modeling has four main components: abstraction, encapsulation, 
modularity and hierarchy. Without this conceptual framework, the program is not object-
oriented even though the language is object-oriented programming 
Object Oriented Analysis (OOA) aims at understanding the system that must grow and 
develop a logic model of the system. This model is based on natural objects from the 
application domain. These objects contain data and have their own behavior from which one 
can express the behavior of the entire system [48]. 
The need to model power systems to simulate the operation probably goes back to the 
origins of electrical networks themselves. The first simulators were analogue simulators 
where scale models of networks could help to predict or know the system behavior.  
They have to cover certain needs such as development or test equipment control and 
protection works.  
Many analogue simulators of this generation, operating in real time are always used. 
Today, there is growing talk of digital simulators. 
The problems that the software's of electrical networks must solve, often involve 
highly complex components which hide a multitude of requirements.  
Today, electric power network are increasingly complex. The first ask is about 
perfectly, and on line, covering the loads power demands. In parallel, the control of 
  
 
functioning disrupted systems and the design of protection safe and selective contribute to 
increase this complexity [49]. 
So, functioning of electric power network is already difficult to define, yet we must 
add requirements (non functional) such as ease of use and maintainability of its software. The 
complexity of the problem itself causes so complex software with real time constraint. 
The complexity of software usually comes from how users and developers see things. 
The experts of electrical networks are finding it hard to provide a precise expression of their 
needs in a form that developers (computers scientist) can include. This misunderstanding is 
not due to either users or developers, but rather the fact that it is a multidisciplinary filed 
(electrical and computer science) and each one of them is lacking competence in the other 
field. In addition, this complexity is increased by the fact that software specifications often 
change during development. Therefore, according to the literature, a vast majority of power 
system software are developed by people in electrical power systems themselves [8]. 
3.2. Object-oriented methods used 
The method used is that proposed by James Rumbaugh and Michael Blaha, called 
Object Modeling Technique (OMT) applies to all processes of software development, from 
analysis to implementation. This method uses three different views, each one of them is 
capturing important aspects of software, and these three views are: 
- The object model that represents the static aspect of software (definitions of classes, 
inheritance relationships, aggregation ...). 
- The dynamic model shows the behaviour of software over time. 
- The functional model that takes into account the aspect function transformation of software. 
Each model contains references to entities of other models, so they are not completely 
independent. The proposed methodology is independent of programming languages and uses 
a standard graphical notation for all phases [50]. 
The three models separate a system into a set of views that are manipulated and evolve 
throughout the development cycle (analysis, design and implementation for OMT). 
Objects are considered basic components that must capture the elements of reality that 
the analyst considers important for an application. 
The dynamic model describes the temporal aspects, workflows and events that cause 
state changes within a class. The role of the dynamic model is to present different aspects of 
  
 
control system. This is reflected in the graphical notation by state diagrams and sequence of 
events. 
The functional model describes the changes made by the system on the functions 
made, and this without worrying about how this is done or when it occurs. The functional 
model is represented with diagrams of data streams. It shows the dependencies between input 
and output of this process responsible for carrying out specific functions of the software. 
The OMT method seems fairly comprehensive to approach a wide class of problems. 
3.3. General structure of the developed tool 
To reap the benefits of TOO (Theory Oriented Object), an object-oriented modeling 
according to OMT was developed for designing software components involved in the 
development process. The strategy for design of electrical power system simulators has led to 
four major parts, (see Figure 3.1). The main parts are: 
1. A graphical editor is specially developed to visualize the single line diagrams of 
electrical networks with windows of dialog boxes. It uses graphic symbols to represent 
elements of the power system such as bus, transmission lines, loads, generators... 
2. A visual database is developed for the user to make entering and editing data in a 
flexible screen. The data are related the single-line diagram and applications to 
execute 
3. Applications that simulate the operation of an electrical network, applications being 
made in this tool are the generator matrix of data and calculation of reliability. 
All parts are developed using Microsoft Visual Studio 2008 version 9.0 with the 
programming language C++. The material used is an Intel PC IV. 
To implement the functionality of the GUI, tools are developed using two hierarchies 
of objects, one derived from the TForm object in Microsoft Visual Studio 2008 to represent 
the windows themselves and the other derived object TGraphicControl Microsoft Visual 




 3.4. Principle of operation of the data generator 
The operation of our data generator has been designed in the most flexible way, after 
opening a new page in the graphical editor that looks good to different publishers known in 
the literature; it contains 21 tabs as can be seen in Figure 3.2. 
 
In the new page we can easily draw any electrical network pattern, either, high 
medium or low voltage. Once the scheme is realized, we must initialize the end of the line to 
know the main branch, which allows us subsequently to know the addresses of other 
branches. 
Figure 3.2. General Structure of the toolbar and commands of the 
publisher. 













In Figure 3.3, we present a scheme of radial network at high voltage (Un = 60kV), 
where the load represents the end of the line. 
 
The program is launched by a simple click on the Startup tab, and then the necessary 
response to the data collection is almost instantaneous, this collection is composed of three 
very important results from which one can calculate any processes involved in the network. 
The results obtained by the program are: 
- The numbering of all elements and their connections to our network. 
- The transfer of the numbers into an array containing all the information about each element 
of the network (27 information for each network element). 
- The transformation of this array of different matrices that are used as data generator of our 
electrical network. 
3.5. Study and analysis of the obtained result 
Let us start with the first results obtained by the program and that is the numbering of 
all elements and their connections in the existing network to explore, we will use the radial 
network above. 
 





One can see in Figure 3.4 that the pattern, and after launching the program, has been 
numbered from 1 to 19 which is equivalent to 10 elements plus 9 links. To be clear, we 
summarize the results in the table below: 
Table 3.1 Summary 
Network Elements Connections between elements 
1: Power station 
(Source) 
2 : Connection between source 1 and Disconnector 3 
3: Disconnector 4 : Connection between Disconnector 3 and Breaker 5 
5: Breaker 6 : Connection between Breaker 5 and Transformer 7 
7: Transformer 8 : Connection between Transformer 7 and Disconnector 9 
9: Disconnector 
10 : Connection between Disconnector  9 and  Disconnector 11 
(Transmission line) 
11: Disconnector 12: Connection between Disconnector11 and Breaker13. 
13: Breaker 14: Connection between Breaker 13 and Transformer 15. 
15: Transformer 16: Connection between Transformer 15 and Disconnector 17. 
17: Disconnector 18: Connection between Disconnector 17 and the load 19 (Consumer). 
19: Load (point)  
 
After this numbering, the program transforms it into a large table of data with more 
precision and detail. This table is divided into 5 small tables which contain 19 elements with 





Figure 3.4 Traditional radial network, numbered, L = 80 km and Un = 60kV 
  
 
Table 3.2 (Element before the considered one) 
 
Consider in Table 3.2 “Elem. Avant x” as the element before the x element. 
The first column contains the number of each item and the numbers of linking 
elements, the columns from 1 to 5 contain each element above. For example, line 4 reads as 
follows: the element 4 has three elements before it, which are the elements 1, 2 and 3, see 
table 2. 




Consider in Table 3.3 “Elem. Apres x” as the element after the x element. 
The columns from 1 to 5 contain each of the next elements and column 6 contains the number 
type of element (Disconnector, bus, batteries ...) see below: 
 
Table 3.4 type of element 
Element Number type 








Emergency source 4 
 






 column contains the number of branch, the 2
nd
 contains the number of 
emergency source and the 3
rd
 contains the probability of failure of the element per year 
[51,52]. 
Table 3.6 (Security elements that comes before) 
 
Consider in Table 5 “Elem. Sec Av x” as the security element before the x element. 
The first column contains the number of security element that precedes the other security 
elements; the columns from 1 to 5 contain each element of security above. For example, on 
line 4, always reads as follows: the element 4 is preceded by the element number 3 of security 
i.e. the element 4 which is a link is preceded by a disconnector which is a security element 
numbered as 3. 
With regard to Table 5, the columns from 1 to 5 contain each element of the following 
security. For example, on line 4, always reads as follows: the element 4 is pursued by the 
security element number 5 i.e. the element 4 which is a link, is preceded by a Breaker, which 





Table 3.7 (Security elements that comes after) 
 
 
Consider in Table 6 “Elem. Sec Ap x” as the security element after the x element. 
The columns from 1 to 5 contain each element of security above. Column 6 shows the number 
of loops that may exist in the network. 
Finally the Tables 1 to 5 will process in several matrices in text format that will contain all 
data necessary to study various phenomena in electrical power systems. 
3.6. Interpretation of matrices 
Our software transforms the tables in different matrices in number of ten; each matrix 
contains information on network elements in order to study its reliability, stability and 
influence of different phenomena that may affect its operation. We start with the most 
important matrix: 
The matrix (FPCT) is composed of 19 rows by 19 columns (the number of network 





Table 3.8: FPCT (Feeder Path Component Trace) Matrix 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 
17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 
18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
 
To interpret the matrix FCTP we take as examples three lines, the 4
th
 element means: 
to supply element 4 by the electric current this last must go through the elements 1, 2 and 3 
(1.power source, 2.connection, 3.disconnector) 
For the 6
th
 element, to feed the 6th element; the current must be going through items 1, 
2, 3, 4 and 5 (1.Power source, 2.Connection, 3.Disconnector, 4.Connection, 5.Breaker). 
Finally line 12, to supply the element 12, the current must go through items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10 and 11 (1.Power source, 2.Connection, 3.disconnector, 4.Connection, 5.Breaker, 
6.Connection, 7.Transformer, 8.Connection, 9.disconnector, 10.Connection, 11.disconnector). 
The matrix (FPST) is composed of 6 rows and 6 columns (the number of protection elements 
in the network) indicates the path by which each element of protection in the power grid is 
supplied [53,54,55]. 
 
Table 3.9: FPST (Feeder Path Segment Trace) Matrix 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
5 3 0 0 0 0 
9 5 3 0 0 0 
11 9 5 3 0 0 
13 11 9 5 3 0 
17 13 11 9 5 3 
  
 
The table 3.9 presents the paths feeding each element of protection of electrical 
network [53,54,55]. 
 
Table 3.10: FST (Forward Segment Trace) Matrix 
5 9 11 13 17 0 
9 11 13 17 0 0 
11 13 17 0 0 0 
13 17 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Rank numbers of all elements of network protection downstream, BST (Backword 
Segment Trace) Matrix [53,54,55]. 
 
Table 3.11: BST (Backward Segment Trace) Matrix 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
5 3 0 0 0 0 
9 5 3 0 0 0 
11 9 5 3 0 0 
13 11 9 5 3 0 
 
Classification numbers of all elements of network protection upstream SW (Switch) 
Matrix 
Table 3.12: Ending Component Trace 
3 5 9 11 13 17 
The number of protection elements ECT (Ending Component Trace) Matrix 
[53,54,55]. 
 
Table 3.13: (Ending Component) Matrix 
19 






The work we have done is just the beginning of a very important work. 
The programming method with "object oriented" allowed us to achieve multifunctional 
software that we have called data generator. With this software, we can draw any pattern 
network with all the necessary components.  
One of the major advantages of this software is the real-time operation that is to say, 
whenever the scheme of a network changes, all information generated by the matrices of the 
software will change and adjusted.  
The operation of our data generator is valid for any type of network (radial, looped or 
meshed) and any voltage level (LV, MV or HV).  
Thus, with information collected by the program, we can study and analyze reliability; 





































4.1. Overall power system (HLIII) adequacy evaluation [58] 
HLIII adequacy evaluation includes all three segments of an electric power system in 
an overall assessment of actual consumer load point adequacy. The primary adequacy indices 
at HLIII are the expected failure rate λ, the average duration of failure and the annual 
unavailability U of the customer load points. Individual customer HLIII indices can also be 
aggregated with the customer average connected load and the number of customers at each 
load point to obtain the HLIII system adequacy indices. These HLIII indices are the system 
average interruption frequency index (SAIFI), the system average interruption duration index 
(SAIDI), the customer average interruption duration index (CAIDI) and the average service 
availability index (ASAI). Analysis of customer failure statistics [40,44] indicates that the 
distribution functional zone makes the greatest individual contribution to overall customer 
supply unavailability. The indices available in here are performance parameters obtained from 
historical event reporting. This section illustrates the prediction of similar indices. 
4.2. Hierarchical level three (HLIII) indices 
The HLIII adequacy assessment presented in this section includes the independent 
outages of generating units, transmission lines, and distribution element failures. The method 
utilized in this research is divided into three steps. 
The computer program was used to obtain the probability, expected frequency and 
duration of each contingency at HLII that leads to load curtailment for each system bus. 
1.  At the sub transmission system level, the impact of all outages was obtained in terms 
of average failure rate and average annual outage time at each distribution system 
supply point. 
2. At the radial distribution level, the effects due to outages of system components such 
as primary main/laterals/low voltage transformers, etc. were considered. A more 




 Figure 4.1: Complete single line diagram of the RBTS 
  
 
a.) The computer program is used to generate, for a specified load level, the following 
parameters at each load bus. 
 λkj= frequency (occ/yr) of contingency j at bus k and 
Ukj = duration (Hrs) of contingency j at bus k. 
If the contingency results in load curtailment, a basic question is: then how would the 
electric utility distribute this interrupted load among its customers. It is obvious that different 
power utilities will take different actions based on their experience, judgments and other 
criteria. A policy that combines the average load curtailed at a bus, alleviation and isolation 
indices is used in here to modify the adequacy indices, probability and frequency at each load 
bus. This research considers, for each contingency j, the load curtailed Ltj at a bus k is 
assumed to be shared proportionately across all the customers. For each contingency j that 
leads to load curtailment of Ltj, the ratio of Ltj to bus peak load is determined. The failure 
probability and failure frequency at each bus k are modified using this ratio. The failure 
probability and frequency due an isolation case is not modified as the isolation affects all the 
customers. 
For alleviation: 
          
    
              
                       
          
    
              
                       
For Isolation: 
                                 
                                  
Step 2 
Having obtained the expected failure frequency and duration for each customer due to 
all contingencies resulting from the composite generation and transmission system, the next 
step is to consider the effects of outages in the distribution networks up to the customer 
supply points. Any outage event that causes isolation of a distribution supply point involves 
all the customers connected at that point. Continuity of supply is assumed to be the sole 
criterion and therefore all load points at a supply point are completely isolated due to outage 
of the supply point. For every event j 
                                 




The final contribution to the individual customer load point indices comes from the 
radial distribution networks. For a given configuration, the outage events contributing to the 
isolation of load point p can be aggregated from each event added as in Step 2. The HLIII 
indices at load point p associated with bus k are as follows: 
                    
 
   
                            
                   
 
   
                            
            
          
           
 
   
                         
Where 
i = step number. 
The failure probability and frequency were obtained for each load bus of the R.B.T.S 
using Step 1. 
4.3. HLIII reliability indices for the R.B.T.S 
The complete results of the HLIII reliability assessment are calculated for the load 
points at buses 3, 4, 5 and 6. The load points at Bus 2 were not calculated because of the 
negligible results in the HLII assessment. Tables 4.1-4 present the HLIII indices at buses 3, 4, 
5 and 6. The tables display the results of the distribution system for every feeder of each bus 
of the Roy Billinton test system (R.B.T.S), the tables below put on view the results of the 
assessment of HLIII for two cases, on one hand they display the results without the effect of 
distributed generation and on the other hand they show the results with distributed generators, 
showing the consequences of introducing DGs in the system. 
The tables below display in addition indices for all the segments in the system at each 
bus of the R.B.T.S. Furthermore as well as individual indices, it is screened on the tables 
indices for the whole buses system like, System average interruption duration index (SAIDI), 
Customer average interruption duration index (Sys_CAIDI), Average service availability index 
(ASAI), and Average service unavailability index (ASUI). 
Tables 4.1-4 (without DG) display that there is a contribution of the HLII in the 
evaluation of HLIII indices if the results in this chapter for load points are compared with 
those of chapter 2, it can be seen that there is an augmentation in the indices both individual 
  
 
and of the system (augmentation in load point failure rate, down time -unavailability-, SAIDI, 
Sys_CAIDI, ASAI and ASUI). Also it can be seen that the unavailability contribution from the 
various zones is different for different customers, tables 4.1 and 4.2 (without DG) show that 
the distribution system contribution to the HLIII indices is small for buses 3 and 4. It can be 
seen from Tables 4.4 that the distribution system contribution to the HLIII indices is 
significant for bus 6, the obvious reason is that customers at bus 6 are supplied through a 
single circuit transmission line and through a single 230/33 kv transformer, i.e. no alternative 
feed for Bus 6 is available. 
Herein this research, an effort for reliability improvement is achieved by using 
distributed generations (DGs) technologies. The introduction of these technologies was made 
in chapter 1. As well as the results ‘without distribution generator’ are screened out on the 
tables, the results ‘with distribution generator’ are also displayed confirming moreover the 
role of introducing (interconnecting) a distributed generator to the system. 
It is clear on all tables 4.1-4 without DG and with DG results, that there is a patent 
difference between the reliability indices either for load point and the whole system. It is 
visible that reliability indices were improved after the DGs are introduced to the system. From 
the ASAI index, continuity of service also was improved if a comparison between without 
and with DG results is done. 
The integration of the distributed source is done at the end of each feeder of the Roy 
Billinton test system (R.B.T.S). A distributed generator is frequently placed at a substation if 
no further land purchases are possible. However, locating generators at substations, 
distributed generator acts only as a backup power source, which may not contribute 
significantly in reliability improvement as far as the entire system is concerned. Instead, 
generators located further out on a circuit can often significantly affect the system reliability, 




Table 4.1. HLIII Load points indices for the RBTS at Bus 3 
Bus 3/Feeder:1 Without DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.251015081 1.254939316 0.3150087 4.0908489 13.165145 0.999533008 0.000467 
 
SW3  0.251015081 1.254939316 0.3150087 
    LP1 SW4  0.305015081 11.50765622 3.5100087 
    
 
SW7  0.251015081 2.303681085 0.5782587 
    
 
SW9  0.251015081 2.303681085 0.5782587 
    LP2 SW10 0.318015081 12.06958073 3.8383087 
    
 
SW13 0.251015081 3.23589599 0.8122587 
    
 
SW15 0.251015081 3.23589599 0.8122587 
    LP3 SW16 0.305015081 13.13806741 4.0073087 
    
 
SW19 0.251015081 4.284637759 1.0755087 
    
 
SW21 0.251015081 4.284637759 1.0755087 
    LP4 SW22 0.324515081 13.46011002 4.3680087 
    LP5 SW25 0.318015081 13.6330286 4.3355087 
    
 
SW28 0.251015081 4.983798938 1.2510087 
    
 
SW30 0.251015081 4.983798938 1.2510087 
    LP6 SW31 0.305015081 14.57635694 4.4460087 
    LP7 SW34 0.305015081 14.57635694 4.4460087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:1 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.251015081 1.254939316 0.3150087 3.349099759 10.778053 0.999617683 0.0003823 
 
SW3  0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP1 SW4  0.305015081 10.88637546 3.3205087 
    
 
SW7  0.251015081 1.548746364 0.3887587 
    
 
SW9  0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP2 SW10 0.318015081 10.64574889 3.3855087 
    
 
SW13 0.251015081 1.432219501 0.3595087 
    
 
SW15 0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP3 SW16 0.305015081 10.88637546 3.3205087 




SW19 0.251015081 1.548746364 0.3887587 
    
 
SW21 0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP4 SW22 0.324515081 10.53266518 3.4180087 
    LP5 SW25 0.318015081 10.64574889 3.3855087 
    
 
SW28 0.251015081 1.199165775 0.3010087 
    
 
SW30 0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP6 SW31 0.305015081 10.88637546 3.3205087 
    LP7 SW34 0.305015081 10.88637546 3.3205087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:2 Without DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.173015081 2.102468132 0.3637587 0.856675361 3.8442067 0.999902206 9.779E-05 
 
SW3  0.173015081 2.102468132 0.3637587 
    LP8 SW4  0.231515081 2.834626113 0.6562587 
    
 
SW6  0.173015081 3.454951387 0.5977587 
    
 
SW8  0.173015081 3.454951387 0.5977587 
    LP9 SW9  0.212015081 3.73916181 0.7927587 
    
 
SW11 0.173015081 4.97649505 0.8610087 
    
 
SW13 0.173015081 4.97649505 0.8610087 
    LP10 SW14 0.225015081 4.981926941 1.1210087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:2 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.173015081 2.102468132 0.3637587 0.335675361 1.5062946 0.999961681 3.832E-05 
 
SW3  0.173015081 0.500006668 0.0865087 
    LP8 SW4  0.231515081 1.637079936 0.3790087 
    
 
SW6  0.173015081 1.852489923 0.3205087 
    
 
SW8  0.173015081 0.500006668 0.0865087 
    LP9 SW9  0.212015081 1.327776745 0.2815087 
    
 
SW11 0.173015081 2.02155033 0.3497587 
    
 
SW13 0.173015081 0.500006668 0.0865087 
    LP10 SW14 0.225015081 1.539935424 0.3465087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:3 Without DG 




SW1  0.251015081 1.254939316 0.3150087 4.331324611 13.766272 0.999505557 0.0004944 
 
SW3  0.251015081 1.254939316 0.3150087 
    LP11 SW4  0.305015081 11.50765622 3.5100087 
    
 
SW7  0.251015081 2.303681085 0.5782587 
    
 
SW9  0.251015081 2.303681085 0.5782587 
    LP12 SW10 0.324515081 11.92797784 3.8708087 
    
 
SW13 0.251015081 3.23589599 0.8122587 
    
 
SW15 0.251015081 3.23589599 0.8122587 
    LP13 SW16 0.318015081 12.80539489 4.0723087 
    LP14 SW19 0.324515081 12.64905372 4.1048087 
    
 
SW22 0.251015081 4.284637759 1.0755087 
    
 
SW24 0.251015081 4.284637759 1.0755087 
    LP15 SW25 0.305015081 14.00097556 4.2705087 
    
 
SW28 0.251015081 4.983798938 1.2510087 
    
 
SW30 0.251015081 4.983798938 1.2510087 
    LP16 SW31 0.318015081 14.18488922 4.5110087 
    LP17 SW34 0.318015081 14.18488922 4.5110087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:3 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.251015081 1.254939316 0.3150087 3.368598705 10.706435 0.999615457 0.0003845 
 
SW3  0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP11 SW4  0.305015081 10.88637546 3.3205087 
    
 
SW7  0.251015081 1.548746364 0.3887587 
    
 
SW9  0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP12 SW10 0.324515081 10.53266518 3.4180087 
    
 
SW13 0.251015081 1.432219501 0.3595087 
    
 
SW15 0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP13 SW16 0.318015081 10.64574889 3.3855087 
    LP14 SW19 0.324515081 10.53266518 3.4180087 
    
 
SW22 0.251015081 1.548746364 0.3887587 
    
 
SW24 0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP15 SW25 0.305015081 10.88637546 3.3205087 




SW28 0.251015081 1.199165775 0.3010087 
    
 
SW30 0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP16 SW31 0.318015081 10.64574889 3.3855087 
    LP17 SW34 0.318015081 10.64574889 3.3855087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:4 Without DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.251015081 1.254939316 0.3150087 4.006995316 12.67976 0.99954258 0.0004574 
 
SW3  0.251015081 1.254939316 0.3150087 
    LP18 SW4  0.318015081 11.24163258 3.5750087 
    
 
SW7  0.251015081 1.954100495 0.4905087 
    
 
SW9  0.251015081 1.954100495 0.4905087 
    LP19 SW10 0.324515081 11.6574203 3.7830087 
    
 
SW13 0.251015081 3.002842264 0.7537587 
    
 
SW15 0.251015081 3.002842264 0.7537587 
    LP20 SW16 0.318015081 12.6211269 4.0137087 
    LP21 SW19 0.305015081 12.94627361 3.9488087 
    
 
SW22 0.251015081 3.935057169 0.9877587 
    
 
SW24 0.251015081 3.935057169 0.9877587 
    LP22 SW25 0.324515081 13.18986064 4.2803087 
    
 
SW28 0.251015081 4.983798938 1.2510087 
    
 
SW30 0.251015081 4.983798938 1.2510087 
    LP23 SW31 0.318015081 14.18488922 4.5110087 
    LP24 SW34 0.305015081 14.57635694 4.4460087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:4 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.251015081 1.254939316 0.3150087 3.375508694 10.68148 0.999614668 0.0003853 
 
SW3  0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP18 SW4  0.318015081 10.64574889 3.3855087 
    
 
SW7  0.251015081 1.199165775 0.3010087 
    
 
SW9  0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP19 SW10 0.324515081 10.53266518 3.4180087 
    
 
SW13 0.251015081 1.548746364 0.3887587 




SW15 0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP20 SW16 0.318015081 10.64574889 3.3855087 
    LP21 SW19 0.305015081 10.88637546 3.3205087 
    
 
SW22 0.251015081 1.432219501 0.3595087 
    
 
SW24 0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP22 SW25 0.324515081 10.53266518 3.4180087 
    
 
SW28 0.251015081 1.548746364 0.3887587 
    
 
SW30 0.251015081 0.500004596 0.1255087 
    LP23 SW31 0.318015081 10.64574889 3.3855087 
    LP24 SW34 0.305015081 10.88637546 3.3205087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:5 Without DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.257515081 1.576640453 0.4060087 4.314234761 13.417307 0.999507507 0.0004925 
 
SW3  0.257515081 1.576640453 0.4060087 
    LP25 SW4  0.324515081 11.29688236 3.6660087 
    
 
SW7  0.257515081 2.598910679 0.6692587 
    
 
SW9  0.257515081 2.598910679 0.6692587 
    LP26 SW10 0.324515081 12.10824681 3.9293087 
    
 
SW13 0.257515081 3.280424163 0.8447587 
    
 
SW15 0.257515081 3.280424163 0.8447587 
    LP27 SW16 0.311515081 12.9679394 4.0397087 
    
 
SW19 0.257515081 3.96213181 1.0203087 
    
 
SW21 0.257515081 3.96213181 1.0203087 
    LP28 SW22 0.324515081 13.18986064 4.2803087 
    LP29 SW25 0.324515081 13.18986064 4.2803087 
    
 
SW28 0.257515081 4.984207873 1.2835087 
    
 
SW30 0.257515081 4.984207873 1.2835087 
    LP30 SW31 0.331015081 13.82416982 4.5760087 
    LP31 SW34 0.311515081 14.37653895 4.4785087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:5 With DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 




SW3  0.257515081 0.50000448 0.1287587 
    LP25 SW4  0.324515081 10.44268477 3.3888087 
    
 
SW7  0.257515081 1.522274705 0.3920087 
    
 
SW9  0.257515081 0.50000448 0.1287587 
    LP26 SW10 0.324515081 10.44268477 3.3888087 
    
 
SW13 0.257515081 1.181517964 0.3042587 
    
 
SW15 0.257515081 0.50000448 0.1287587 
    LP27 SW16 0.311515081 10.66981632 3.3238087 
    
 
SW19 0.257515081 1.181517964 0.3042587 
    
 
SW21 0.257515081 0.50000448 0.1287587 
    LP28 SW22 0.324515081 10.44268477 3.3888087 
    LP29 SW25 0.324515081 10.44268477 3.3888087 
    
 
SW28 0.257515081 1.522274705 0.3920087 
    
 
SW30 0.257515081 0.50000448 0.1287587 
    LP30 SW31 0.331015081 10.33580912 3.4213087 
    LP31 SW34 0.311515081 10.66981632 3.3238087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:6 Without DG 
LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.218515081 1.634938387 0.3572587 4.059309475 14.544739 0.999536609 0.0004634 
 
SW3  0.218515081 1.634938387 0.3572587 
    LP32 SW4  0.272515081 13.03490684 3.5522087 
    LP33 SW7  0.292015081 12.49869932 3.6498087 
    
 
SW10 0.218515081 2.705802691 0.5912587 
    
 
SW12 0.218515081 2.705802691 0.5912587 
    LP34 SW13 0.272515081 13.89357492 3.7862087 
    LP35 SW16 0.285515081 13.48898517 3.8513087 
    
 
SW19 0.218515081 3.910525032 0.8545087 
    
 
SW21 0.218515081 3.910525032 0.8545087 
    LP36 SW22 0.272515081 14.85975998 4.0495087 
    
 
SW25 0.218515081 4.981389335 1.0885087 
    
 
SW27 0.218515081 4.981389335 1.0885087 
    LP37 SW28 0.272515081 15.71842805 4.2835087 
    
  
 
LP38 SW31 0.292015081 15.00267958 4.3810087 
    Bus 3/Feeder:6 With DG 
LP Nbr ent_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.218515081 1.634938387 0.3572587 3.337109085 11.957054 0.999619051 0.0003809 
 
SW3  0.218515081 0.500005279 0.1092587 
    LP32 SW4  0.272515081 12.12486546 3.3042087 
    LP33 SW7  0.292015081 11.64908567 3.4017087 
    
 
SW10 0.218515081 1.570869583 0.3432587 
    
 
SW12 0.218515081 0.500005279 0.1092587 
    LP34 SW13 0.272515081 12.12486546 3.3042087 
    LP35 SW16 0.285515081 11.80080815 3.3693087 
    
 
SW19 0.218515081 1.704727621 0.3725087 
    
 
SW21 0.218515081 0.500005279 0.1092587 
    LP36 SW22 0.272515081 12.12486546 3.3042087 
    
 
SW25 0.218515081 1.570869583 0.3432587 
    
 
SW27 0.218515081 0.500005279 0.1092587 
    LP37 SW28 0.272515081 12.12486546 3.3042087 
    LP38 SW31 0.292015081 11.64908567 3.4017087 

















Table 4.2. HLIII Load points indices for the RBTS at Bus 4 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:1 Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.244500836 1.454514704 0.3556301 4.00180006 13.119349 0.999543174 0.0004568 
 
SW3  0.244500836 1.454514704 0.3556301 
 
LP1 SW4  0.298500836 11.89477428 3.5506001 
 
SW7  0.244500836 2.411566648 0.5896301 
 
SW9  0.244500836 2.411566648 0.5896301 
LP2 SW10 0.308250836 12.43597622 3.8334001 
 
SW13 0.244500836 3.368618593 0.8236301 
 
SW15 0.244500836 3.368618593 0.8236301 
LP3 SW16 0.298500836 13.46260909 4.0186001 
 
SW19 0.244500836 4.265834341 1.0430001 
 
SW21 0.244500836 4.265834341 1.0430001 
LP4 SW22 0.311500836 13.81376732 4.3030001 
LP5 SW25 0.308250836 13.90653185 4.2867001 
 
SW28 0.244500836 4.983623299 1.2185001 
 
SW30 0.244500836 4.983623299 1.2185001 
LP6 SW31 0.311500836 14.37716869 4.4785001 
LP7 SW34 0.308250836 14.47619778 4.4623001 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:1 With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.244500836 1.454514704 0.3556301 3.349928242 10.982277 0.999617588 0.0003824 
 
SW3  0.244500836 0.499998539 0.1222501 
 
LP1 SW4  0.298500836 11.11320193 3.3173001 
 
SW7  0.244500836 1.457050483 0.3562501 
 
SW9  0.244500836 0.499998539 0.1222501 
LP2 SW10 0.308250836 10.91967863 3.3660001 
 
SW13 0.244500836 1.457050483 0.3562501 
 
SW15 0.244500836 0.499998539 0.1222501 
LP3 SW16 0.298500836 11.11320193 3.3173001 
 




SW21 0.244500836 0.499998539 0.1222501 
LP4 SW22 0.311500836 10.85807701 3.3823001 
LP5 SW25 0.308250836 10.91967863 3.3660001 
 
SW28 0.244500836 1.217787497 0.2977501 
 
SW30 0.244500836 0.499998539 0.1222501 
LP6 SW31 0.311500836 10.85807701 3.3823001 
LP7 SW34 0.308250836 10.91967863 3.3660001 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:2 Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.147000836 2.18706281 0.3215001 0.768916727 3.9720021 0.999912224 8.778E-05 
 
SW3  0.147000836 2.18706281 0.3215001 
 
LP8 SW4  0.186000836 2.776869572 0.5165001 
 
SW6  0.147000836 3.778890497 0.5555001 
 
SW8  0.147000836 3.778890497 0.5555001 
LP9 SW9  0.195750836 4.08299693 0.7992501 
 
SW11 0.147000836 4.972761263 0.7310001 
 
SW13 0.147000836 4.972761263 0.7310001 
LP10 SW14 0.199000836 4.979878893 0.9910001 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:2 With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.147000836 2.18706281 0.3215001 0.306416727 1.5828605 0.999965021 3.498E-05 
 
SW3  0.147000836 0.499997569 0.0735001 
 
LP8 SW4  0.186000836 1.443542228 0.2685001 
 
SW6  0.147000836 2.091825256 0.3075001 
 
SW8  0.147000836 0.499997569 0.0735001 
LP9 SW9  0.195750836 1.620683046 0.3172501 
 
SW11 0.147000836 1.693868335 0.2490001 
 
SW13 0.147000836 0.499997569 0.0735001 
LP10 SW14 0.199000836 1.675872664 0.3335001 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:3 Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 




SW3  0.234750836 1.494137645 0.3507501 
 
LP11 SW4  0.301750836 11.96616425 3.6108001 
 
SW7  0.234750836 2.241738818 0.5262501 
 
SW9  0.234750836 2.241738818 0.5262501 
LP12 SW10 0.298500836 12.6297806 3.7700001 
 
SW13 0.234750836 3.238540382 0.7602501 
 
SW15 0.234750836 3.238540382 0.7602501 
LP13 SW16 0.298500836 13.413698 4.0040001 
LP14 SW19 0.288750836 13.69762291 3.9552001 
 
SW22 0.234750836 4.235341946 0.9942501 
 
SW24 0.234750836 4.235341946 0.9942501 
LP15 SW25 0.298500836 14.1976154 4.2380001 
 
SW28 0.234750836 4.983156111 1.1698001 
 
SW30 0.234750836 4.983156111 1.1698001 
LP16 SW31 0.298500836 14.78555346 4.4135001 
LP17 SW34 0.288750836 15.11580063 4.3647001 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:3 With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.234750836 1.494137645 0.3507501 3.354177333 11.289262 0.999617103 0.0003829 
 
SW3  0.234750836 0.499977179 0.1173701 
 
LP11 SW4  0.301750836 11.19267841 3.3774001 
 
SW7  0.234750836 1.24762095 0.2928801 
 
SW9  0.234750836 0.499977179 0.1173701 
LP12 SW10 0.298500836 11.25993518 3.3611001 
 
SW13 0.234750836 1.496778743 0.3513701 
 
SW15 0.234750836 0.499977179 0.1173701 
LP13 SW16 0.298500836 11.25993518 3.3611001 
LP14 SW19 0.288750836 11.47148217 3.3124001 
 
SW22 0.234750836 1.496778743 0.3513701 
 
SW24 0.234750836 0.499977179 0.1173701 
LP15 SW25 0.298500836 11.25993518 3.3611001 
 




SW30 0.234750836 0.499977179 0.1173701 
LP16 SW31 0.298500836 11.25993518 3.3611001 
LP17 SW34 0.288750836 11.47148217 3.3124001 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:4Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.251000836 1.488043096 0.3735001 3.953008522 12.689184 0.999548743 0.0004513 
 
SW3  0.251000836 1.488043096 0.3735001 
 
LP18 SW4  0.314750836 11.49258287 3.6173001 
 
SW7  0.251000836 2.420310909 0.6075001 
 
SW9  0.251000836 2.420310909 0.6075001 
LP19 SW10 0.305000836 12.46717916 3.8025001 
LP20 SW13 0.314750836 12.23571036 3.8512001 
 
SW16 0.251000836 3.352578722 0.8415001 
 
SW18 0.251000836 3.352578722 0.8415001 
LP21 SW19 0.314750836 12.97915557 4.0852001 
LP22 SW22 0.305000836 13.23439017 4.0365001 
 
SW25 0.251000836 4.284846535 1.0755001 
 
SW27 0.251000836 4.284846535 1.0755001 
LP23 SW28 0.314750836 13.72260078 4.3192001 
 
SW31 0.251000836 4.984047395 1.2510001 
 
SW33 0.251000836 4.984047395 1.2510001 
LP24 SW34 0.314750836 14.28018468 4.4947001 
LP25 SW37 0.305000836 14.57700945 4.4460001 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:4With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.251000836 1.488043096 0.3735001 3.353158522 10.763661 0.999617219 0.0003828 
 
SW3  0.251000836 0.499998576 0.1255001 
 
LP18 SW4  0.314750836 10.70465804 3.3693001 
 
SW7  0.251000836 1.432266389 0.3595001 
 
SW9  0.251000836 0.499998576 0.1255001 
LP19 SW10 0.305000836 10.88685562 3.3205001 




SW16 0.251000836 1.432266389 0.3595001 
 
SW18 0.251000836 0.499998576 0.1255001 
LP21 SW19 0.314750836 10.70465804 3.3693001 
LP22 SW22 0.305000836 10.88685562 3.3205001 
 
SW25 0.251000836 1.432266389 0.3595001 
 
SW27 0.251000836 0.499998576 0.1255001 
LP23 SW28 0.314750836 10.70465804 3.3693001 
 
SW31 0.251000836 1.199199436 0.3010001 
 
SW33 0.251000836 0.499998576 0.1255001 
LP24 SW34 0.314750836 10.70465804 3.3693001 
LP25 SW37 0.305000836 10.88685562 3.3205001 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:5Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.143750836 2.225239661 0.3198801 0.74292006 3.9032406 0.999915192 8.481E-05 
 
SW3  0.143750836 2.225239661 0.3198801 
 
LP26 SW4  0.192500836 2.927935658 0.5636301 
 
SW6  0.143750836 3.44610213 0.4953801 
 
SW8  0.143750836 3.44610213 0.4953801 
LP27 SW9  0.195750836 3.858885498 0.7553801 
 
SW11 0.143750836 4.972145434 0.7147501 
 
SW13 0.143750836 4.972145434 0.7147501 
LP28 SW14 0.182750836 4.978089747 0.9097501 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:5With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.143750836 2.225239661 0.3198801 0.304793394 1.6013593 0.999965206 3.479E-05 
 
SW3  0.143750836 0.499997514 0.0718751 
 
LP26 SW4  0.192500836 1.639629561 0.3156301 
 
SW6  0.143750836 1.720894766 0.2473801 
 
SW8  0.143750836 0.499997514 0.0718751 
LP27 SW9  0.195750836 1.695420914 0.3318801 
 
SW11 0.143750836 2.026075601 0.2912501 
 
SW13 0.143750836 0.499997514 0.0718751 
  
 
LP28 SW14 0.182750836 1.460294612 0.2668701 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:6Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.156750836 1.98882551 0.3117501 0.75700006 3.8040044 0.999913584 8.642E-05 
 
SW3  0.156750836 1.98882551 0.3117501 
 
LP29 SW4  0.195750836 2.588750434 0.5067501 
 
SW6  0.156750836 3.48164052 0.5457501 
 
SW8  0.156750836 3.48164052 0.5457501 
LP30 SW9  0.205500836 3.841833823 0.7895001 
 
SW11 0.156750836 4.974455529 0.7797501 
 
SW13 0.156750836 4.974455529 0.7797501 
LP31 SW14 0.195750836 4.979544827 0.9747501 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:6With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.156750836 1.98882551 0.3117501 0.289626727 1.4554046 0.999966938 3.306E-05 
 
SW3  0.156750836 0.49999772 0.0783751 
 
LP29 SW4  0.195750836 1.396571615 0.2733801 
 
SW6  0.156750836 1.992844628 0.3123801 
 
SW8  0.156750836 0.49999772 0.0783751 
LP30 SW9  0.205500836 1.567487838 0.3221201 
 
SW11 0.156750836 1.992844628 0.3123801 
 
SW13 0.156750836 0.49999772 0.0783751 
LP31 SW14 0.195750836 1.396571615 0.2733801 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:7Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.238000836 1.480583292 0.3523801 3.986285332 13.258118 0.999544945 0.0004551 
 
SW3  0.238000836 1.480583292 0.3523801 
 
LP32 SW4  0.305000836 11.84390218 3.6124001 
 
SW7  0.238000836 2.217975661 0.5278801 
 
SW9  0.238000836 2.217975661 0.5278801 
LP33 SW10 0.305000836 12.41931044 3.7879001 
 




SW15 0.238000836 3.139695114 0.7472501 
LP34 SW16 0.292000836 13.50098897 3.9423001 
LP35 SW19 0.305000836 13.13865273 4.0073001 
 
SW22 0.238000836 4.061456584 0.9666301 
 
SW24 0.238000836 4.061456584 0.9666301 
LP36 SW25 0.292000836 14.25201422 4.1616001 
 
SW28 0.238000836 4.983176038 1.1860001 
 
SW30 0.238000836 4.983176038 1.1860001 
LP37 SW31 0.305000836 14.57700945 4.4460001 
LP38 SW34 0.292000836 15.00338193 4.3810001 
 
Bus 4/Feeder:7With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.238000836 1.480583292 0.3523801 3.357333394 11.166266 0.999616743 0.0003833 
 
SW3  0.238000836 0.499998499 0.1190001 
 
LP32 SW4  0.305000836 11.07865837 3.3790001 
 
SW7  0.238000836 1.237390868 0.2945001 
 
SW9  0.238000836 0.499998499 0.1190001 
LP33 SW10 0.305000836 11.07865837 3.3790001 
 
SW13 0.238000836 1.421759969 0.3383801 
 
SW15 0.238000836 0.499998499 0.1190001 
LP34 SW16 0.292000836 11.3492828 3.3140001 
LP35 SW19 0.305000836 11.07865837 3.3790001 
 
SW22 0.238000836 1.421759969 0.3383801 
 
SW24 0.238000836 0.499998499 0.1190001 
LP36 SW25 0.292000836 11.3492828 3.3140001 
 
SW28 0.238000836 1.421759969 0.3383801 
 
SW30 0.238000836 0.499998499 0.1190001 
LP37 SW31 0.305000836 11.07865837 3.3790001 






Table 4.3. HLIII Load points indices for the RBTS at Bus 5 
 
Bus 5/Feeder:1 Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.1753 1.4100882 0.2471885 3.616078701 15.581028 0.999587206 0.0004128 
LP1 SW3  0.2423 14.47477698 3.5072385 
    LP2 SW6  0.2423 14.47477698 3.5072385 
    
 
SW9  0.1753 2.494686033 0.4373185 
    LP3 SW11 0.2423 15.25934157 3.6973385 
    LP4 SW14 0.2228 16.15726419 3.5998385 
    
 
SW17 0.1753 3.57922682 0.6274385 
    LP5 SW19 0.23255 16.50672312 3.8386385 
    LP6 SW22 0.2228 17.01049579 3.7899385 
    
 
SW25 0.1753 4.914081355 0.8614385 
    LP7 SW27 0.2423 17.0096511 4.1214385 
    
 
Bus 5/Feeder:1 With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.1753 1.4100882 0.2471885 3.473018614 14.964608 0.999603537 0.0003965 
LP1 SW3  0.2423 14.47477698 3.5072385 
    LP2 SW6  0.2423 14.47477698 3.5072385 
    
 
SW9  0.1753 1.580538856 0.2770685 
    LP3 SW11 0.2423 14.59776501 3.5370385 
    LP4 SW14 0.2228 15.43778484 3.4395385 
    
 
SW17 0.1753 1.580538856 0.2770685 
    LP5 SW19 0.23255 15.0003804 3.4883385 
    LP6 SW22 0.2228 15.43778484 3.4395385 
    
 
SW25 0.1753 1.830795559 0.3209385 
    LP7 SW27 0.2423 14.77894536 3.5809385 
    
 
Bus 5/Feeder:2 Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.2078 1.478914637 0.3073185 3.505759689 13.107784 0.999599799 0.0004002 
LP8 SW3  0.2553 13.59121998 3.4698385 
    
 
SW6  0.2078 1.200377582 0.2494385 
    
  
 
LP9 SW8  0.26505 13.05692685 3.4607385 
    
 
SW11 0.2078 1.411542163 0.2933185 
    LP10 SW13 0.2748 12.93063487 3.5533385 
    
 
SW16 0.2078 1.200377582 0.2494385 
    LP11 SW18 0.26505 13.05692685 3.4607385 
    
 
SW21 0.2078 1.622658621 0.3371885 
    LP12 SW23 0.2553 13.7083371 3.4997385 
    LP13 SW26 0.26505 13.38780782 3.5484385 
    
 
Bus 5/Feeder:2 With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.2078 1.478914637 0.3073185 3.505759689 13.107784 0.999599799 0.0004002 
LP8 SW3  0.2553 13.59121998 3.4698385 
    
 
SW6  0.2078 1.200377582 0.2494385 
    LP9 SW8  0.26505 13.05692685 3.4607385 
    
 
SW11 0.2078 1.411542163 0.2933185 
    LP10 SW13 0.2748 12.93063487 3.5533385 
    
 
SW16 0.2078 1.200377582 0.2494385 
    LP11 SW18 0.26505 13.05692685 3.4607385 
    
 
SW21 0.2078 1.622658621 0.3371885 
    LP12 SW23 0.2553 13.7083371 3.4997385 
    LP13 SW26 0.26505 13.38780782 3.5484385 
    
 
Bus 5/Feeder:3 Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.1753 1.910658651 0.3349385 3.707563736 15.940634 0.999576762 0.0004232 
LP14 SW3  0.2423 14.83672498 3.5949385 
    
 
SW6  0.1753 2.744942736 0.4811885 
    LP15 SW8  0.23255 15.87804112 3.6924385 
    LP16 SW11 0.2228 16.35430189 3.6437385 
    
 
SW14 0.1753 3.829540568 0.6713185 
    LP17 SW16 0.2423 16.22508651 3.9313385 
    
 
SW19 0.1753 4.914081355 0.8614385 
    LP18 SW21 0.2228 18.06076509 4.0239385 
    
  
 
LP19 SW24 0.2423 17.0096511 4.1214385 
    
 
Bus 5/Feeder:3 With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.1753 1.910658651 0.3349385 3.452938462 14.845875 0.999605829 0.0003942 
LP14 SW3  0.2423 14.83672498 3.5949385 
    
 
SW6  0.1753 1.330225109 0.2331885 
    LP15 SW8  0.23255 14.81160379 3.4444385 
    LP16 SW11 0.2228 15.24119597 3.3957385 
    
 
SW14 0.1753 1.580538856 0.2770685 
    LP17 SW16 0.2423 14.59776501 3.5370385 
    
 
SW19 0.1753 1.580538856 0.2770685 
    LP18 SW21 0.2228 15.43778484 3.4395385 
    LP19 SW24 0.2423 14.59776501 3.5370385 
    
 
Bus 5/Feeder:4 Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.16555 1.728713147 0.2861885 3.76115573 16.918076 0.999570644 0.0004294 
LP20 SW3  0.23255 15.24935911 3.5462385 
    LP21 SW6  0.21305 16.18746051 3.4487385 
    
 
SW9  0.16555 2.612132054 0.4324385 
    LP22 SW11 0.2228 16.35430189 3.6437385 
    LP23 SW14 0.23255 15.87804112 3.6924385 
    
 
SW17 0.16555 3.495550961 0.5786885 
    LP24 SW19 0.2228 17.01049579 3.7899385 
    
 
SW22 0.16555 4.909021211 0.8126885 
    LP25 SW24 0.21305 18.65871139 3.9752385 
    LP26 SW27 0.23255 17.51338835 4.0727385 
    
 
Bus 5/Feeder:4 With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  0.16555 1.728713147 0.2861885 3.507670854 15.777875 0.999599581 0.0004004 
LP20 SW3  0.23255 15.24935911 3.5462385 
    LP21 SW6  0.21305 16.18746051 3.4487385 
    
 
SW9  0.16555 1.379090677 0.2283085 
    
  
 
LP22 SW11 0.2228 15.43778484 3.4395385 
    LP23 SW14 0.23255 15.0003804 3.4883385 
    
 
SW17 0.16555 1.379090677 0.2283085 
    LP24 SW19 0.2228 15.43778484 3.4395385 
    
 
SW22 0.16555 1.909142021 0.3160585 
    LP25 SW24 0.21305 16.32733378 3.4785385 
    LP26 SW27 0.23255 15.3775036 3.5760385 




















Table 4.4. HLIII Load points indices for the RBTS at Bus 6 
 
Bus 6/Feeder:1 Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  1.32665 0.469937436 0.6234425 4.327144856 3.1219007 0.999506034 0.000494 
LP1 SW3  1.38065 2.765684641 3.8184425 
    
 
SW6  1.32665 0.60222553 0.7989425 
    LP2 SW8  1.39365 2.912454705 4.0589425 
    
 
SW11 1.32665 0.767589417 1.0183225 
    LP3 SW13 1.3904 3.065335515 4.2620425 
    
 
SW16 1.32665 0.932945766 1.2376925 
    LP4 SW18 1.38065 3.210547568 4.4326425 
    
 
SW21 1.32665 1.065271549 1.4132425 
    LP5 SW23 1.3904 3.349354502 4.6569425 
    
 
SW26 1.32665 1.241655674 1.6472425 
    LP6 SW28 1.38065 3.507146996 4.8421425 
    
 
Bus 6/Feeder:1 With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  1.32665 0.469937436 0.6234425 3.822259516 2.7576416 0.999563669 0.0004363 
LP1 SW3  1.38065 2.765684641 3.8184425 
    
 
SW6  1.32665 0.426308748 0.5655625 
    LP2 SW8  1.39365 2.744980806 3.8255425 
    
 
SW11 1.32665 0.45938454 0.6094425 
    LP3 SW13 1.3904 2.771247483 3.8531425 
    
 
SW16 1.32665 0.45938454 0.6094425 
    LP4 SW18 1.38065 2.75554449 3.8044425 
    
 
SW21 1.32665 0.426316285 0.5655725 
    LP5 SW23 1.3904 2.739745757 3.8093425 
    
 
SW26 1.32665 0.470412317 0.6240725 
    LP6 SW28 1.38065 2.766119219 3.8190425 
    
 
Bus 6/Feeder:2 Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  1.3559 0.438227377 0.5941925 4.412144977 3.1119688 0.99949633 0.0005037 
  
 
LP7 SW3  1.41965 2.70344275 3.8379425 
    
 
SW6  1.3559 0.600023969 0.8135725 
    LP8 SW8  1.4229 2.862845246 4.0735425 
    
 
SW11 1.3559 0.729458293 0.9890725 
    LP9 SW13 1.4229 2.986184904 4.2490425 
    
 
SW16 1.3559 0.858892617 1.1645725 
    LP10 SW18 1.4099 3.092093411 4.3595425 
    
 
SW21 1.3559 1.031449591 1.3985425 
    LP11 SW23 1.41965 3.270061283 4.6423425 
    
 
SW26 1.3559 1.193260934 1.6179425 
    LP12 SW28 1.4099 3.413676502 4.8129425 
    
 
SW31 1.3559 1.322695258 1.7934425 
    LP13 SW33 1.41965 3.548228437 5.0372425 
    
 
Bus 6/Feeder:2 With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  1.3559 0.438227377 0.5941925 3.837041262 2.7063373 0.999561982 0.000438 
LP7 SW3  1.41965 2.70344275 3.8379425 
    
 
SW6  1.3559 0.4602644 0.6240725 
    LP8 SW8  1.4229 2.729666526 3.8840425 
    
 
SW11 1.3559 0.427902131 0.5801925 
    LP9 SW13 1.4229 2.698884321 3.8402425 
    
 
SW16 1.3559 0.427902131 0.5801925 
    LP10 SW18 1.4099 2.677595929 3.7751425 
    
 
SW21 1.3559 0.471046906 0.6386925 
    LP11 SW23 1.41965 2.734788504 3.8824425 
    
 
SW26 1.3559 0.4602644 0.6240725 
    LP12 SW28 1.4099 2.708732889 3.8190425 
    
 
SW31 1.3559 0.427902131 0.5801925 
    LP13 SW33 1.41965 2.693581164 3.8239425 
    
 
Bus 6/Feeder:3 Without DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  1.2389 0.467812172 0.5795725 3.822102045 2.9569777 0.999563687 0.0004363 
  
 
LP14 SW3  1.2929 2.919438858 3.7745425 
    
 
SW6  1.2389 0.656689402 0.8135725 
    LP15 SW8  1.28765 0.821125694 1.0573225 
    
 
SW10 1.2389 0.798347324 0.9890725 
    LP16 SW12 1.2909 0.967598187 1.2490725 
    
 
SW14 1.2389 0.975415691 1.2084425 
    LP17 SW16 1.2929 3.405864723 4.4034425 
    
 
Bus 6/Feeder:3 With DG 
 LP Nbr Segment_Name Seg_LP_FR Seg_LP_REP Seg_DTs SAIDI Sys_CAIDI ASAI ASUI 
 
SW1  1.2389 0.467812172 0.5795725 3.498022045 2.7062525 0.999600682 0.0003993 
LP14 SW3  1.2929 2.919438858 3.7745425 
    
 
SW6  1.2389 0.468312616 0.5801925 
    LP15 SW8  1.28765 0.639880791 0.8239425 
    
 
SW10 1.2389 0.421093309 0.5216925 
    LP16 SW12 1.2909 0.605540708 0.7816925 
    
 
SW14 1.2389 0.456511825 0.5655725 
    LP17 SW16 1.2929 2.908610488 3.7605425 





 This chapter presents the concepts of the application to overall assessment of a power 
system, which deals with actual customer levels of service, and illustrates the calculation of 
reliability indices at customer load points. It is an important requirement in today’s changing 
utilities environment. Indices for the HLIII functional zone are presented and depicted here. 
At the HLIII system level, the required data are the results from the HLII analysis, and the 
distribution system analysis outcomes from chapter 2, i.e. the relative contribution to the 




































The basic objective of the research work in this thesis is to develop a reliability 
evaluation of a complete electric power system including generation, transmission and 
distribution facilities, this study is also identified as HLIII assessment. The prime objective of 
the research on one hand is to put a foot in the world of power system reliability assessment 
by performing a reliability assessment at HLIII, i.e., to consider the independent failures in 
the three functional zones of generation, transmission and distribution, in order to obtain 
practical estimates of the reliability indices for each system customer load point. On the other 
hand, the objective was to have a base in the world of technical software, and specially 
reliability evaluation software. 
The hierarchical level three (HLIII) adequacy assessments was performed, in this 
thesis the study do not starts at the (HLI) evaluation but it begins at the (HLII) study, this case 
is known as the composite system generation and transmission systems adequacy assessment, 
after that a distribution system assessment is achieved with the assumption of having (HLII) is 
100% reliable, after that and at the end the (HLIII) assessment can be completed by combining 
results from (HLII) and those obtained from the distribution system evaluation. It was 
possible to perform an adequacy study of (HLI) and (HLII) separately and then after 
combining the results to get the (HLII) results and then later perform (HLIII) adequacy 
evaluation, both ways gives the same results. 
The well known Roy Billinton test system (R.B.T.S) is described in details and used in 
the study to show the performance of the techniques used in the assessments. Reliability 
indices were calculated for the entire system load points at all buses and for every system 
feeder. 
The thesis presents basic indices for HLII, HLIII adequacy evaluation by application 
to the R.B.T.S. The overall adequacy evaluation is performed at load points of buses 3,4,5 and 
6. The basic adequacy indices are different for each hierarchical level and respond to the 
recognition of different factors and objectives at each level. HLIII adequacy indices are 
important as they recognize failures in all parts of an electric power system. The HLIII system 
performance indices depend on many factors, including the reliability of major components, 
such as generators, transmission lines, distribution feeder elements like, main circuit breakers 
and fuses. 
 Reliability indices were established for the (HLII), those indices concern the 
probability and the frequency for both system states and the failure events outgoing from 
these states. The expected load curtailment, expected energy not supplied and the expected 
  
 
durations emerging from these states are investigated. Frequencies and unavailabilities indices 
of each bus were also explored. 
Apropos distribution system evaluation study, it was done separately i.e., without the 
effect of the generation and transmission system.  In this case, a reliability analysis algorithm 
is presented. Sets calculations coupled with circuit traces are used to calculate the reliability 
of a given load point and the entire system at each bus. A computer program has been 
developed to implement this algorithm. The placement of distributed generation and its effects 
on reliability has been efficiently investigated. Here reliability indices produced by the 
reliability analysis program for particular segments and the entire system provide concrete 
figures to assess reliability improvements. At this level investigated over the related indices 
where established, these indices are related to individual load points and segments and others 
related to the entire system reliability, on one hand these indices show the failure rate, down 
time -unavailability- and the Rel_CAIDI for every load point in the feeders of the distribution 
system, on the other hand indices for the whole system are calculated such as, SAIDI and 
Sys_CAIDI. 
Conclusions from the investigations concerning the distribution system assessment 
assuming that HLII is 100% reliable are: 
 The created reliability analysis algorithm is fast enough on large systems to be used in 
i n t e r a c t i v e  d e s i g n  s t u d i e s . 
 A new reliability index, Relative_CAIDI, has been proposed which makes it easier for a 
design engineer to find circuit locations in need of improvement 
 Placing distributed generators further out on a circuit, instead of locating them in the 
substation, can help enhance a system’s reliability. 
In chapter 3 a draw up data generator as evaluation tools for the electrical system 
reliability of the grid networks was performed, it is a first try in its kind of work in Algeria. It 
is the realization stage of the technique described in chapter 2 used for the distribution system 
reliability evaluation. The programming method uses "object oriented" technology it allow to 
achieve multifunctional software called data generator. The software gives the possibility of 
drawing any pattern network with all the necessary components. 
  
 
Thus, with the collected information by the data generator, studying and analyzing 
reliability; stability (dynamic and static) and load flow calculation, short-circuit calculation is 
possible. 
At the end, adequacy indices were established for the (HLIII), the calculation is done 
by using the appropriate techniques illustrated in chapter 4 these indices include the same 
indices calculated in the assessment of the distribution system (with the assumption that HLII 
is 100% reliable). A comparison between these two sets of indices is investigated; this shows 
the effect of passing from HLII to HLIII on the individual load point indices and the entire 
system indices. 
Furthermore in this research, an effort for overall power system reliability 
improvement is considered. This improvement in reliability is achieved by the interconnection 
of distributed generations (DGs), also known as distributed resources (DRs) to the system at 
the end points in the system feeder at each bus of the Roy Billinton test system (R.B.T.S). The 
investigations were done by comparing the results between those calculated without the DGs 
and those after the introduction of the DGs in the system. The calculation shows that there is a 
patent improvement of the overall power system reliability. This gives to the DGs 
technologies an additional function to their use in today power system. 
The techniques developed in this research work and described in this thesis cover a 
wide range of applications. The primary focus, however, was to develop procedures which 
can be used to evaluate load point indices in order to provide to the customers an adequate 
electric power delivery in quality and in continuity of service, associated with system 
configuration reinforcement and modifications. It is believed that the techniques described in 
this thesis can prove useful to power system planners and managers when considering 
alternate facilities configurations and in making decisions regarding reliability in electric 
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